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ABSTRACT 
JUSTIN M. BURNETT:  Democratic paradox: The role of regime type in civil war intervention 
initiation and success. 
(Under the direction of Dr. Timothy Nordstrom) 
 Regime type is an important yet largely ignored factor in the likelihood of civil war 
intervention initiation and success.  Most research related to intervention processes has analyzed 
these processes without questioning whether or not domestic political institutions and constraints 
affect the decision to intervene as well as the probability of success.  Democracies have unique 
institutions and recognized norms that do not exist in non-democratic states.  I argue that these 
differences matter and that domestic political audiences in democracies can more effectively 
drive foreign policy decisions than populations in non-democratic states.  When democratic 
populations are exposed to media images of particularly violent conflict they have the 
opportunity to assess the need for intervention based on ingrained democratic norms.  I believe 
that this leads to democratic policy makers being compelled to intervene in the most intractable 
conflicts in response to demands from domestic audiences.  However, due to the difficulty of 
intervention in these conflicts I argue that the same type of political pressure that leads to 
intervention in these conflicts also serves to pressure policy makers to withdraw prior to 
successful completion of the mission.  By drawing from a wide variety of literatures related to 
conflict I proposed two hypotheses to test the whether or not regime type influences the decision 
to intervene and the probable success of all intervention opportunities from 1945-2012.  I found 
empirical evidence that supports my assertion that democracies are more likely than non-
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democracies to intervene in the most intractable conflicts.  With regard to my theory on success I 
did not find strong evidence that indicates that democracies are less likely to be successful than 
their non-democratic counter parts.  Rather, it appears that they are simply less successful than 
when they engage in interstate war.
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CHAPTER 1:  THE STUDY OF CIVIL WAR INTERVENTION 
1.1  Introduction 
 Throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first there has been a significant 
decline in the instance of interstate warfare.  However, throughout this same period, the world 
has witnessed a sharp rise in the number of internal conflicts.  It is therefore unsurprising that 
scholars in the field of international relations have turned their attention to this phenomenon.  
Much of this research has focused on the internal characteristics of the civil war state and the 
reasons for and consequences of failing to resolve these conflicts.  More recently scholars have 
devoted their attention to third party interventions in intrastate conflicts.  One line of research 
focuses intervention processes in the pre-intervention period.  Third-parties choose to intervene 
in intrastate wars for a variety of reasons.  Protecting vital national or regional interests that 
could be jeopardized by particular states being in a state of civil war or a belief that intervention 
should be undertaken in order to provide humanitarian relief to the conflicted population are but 
a few examples of reasons a third-party will choose to intervene.  While domestic politics has 
been considered in the literature on civil war processes, it has not been examined as a driver for 
intervention.  That is, no effort to consider how domestic political pressure can affect the 
intervention decision calculus has yet been undertaken.   
 Similarly, intervention success is another area in the conflict literature that has received a 
great deal of attention in recent years.  Reasons for success and failure of civil war intervention 
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have been attributed to the internal characteristics of the state in conflict, the capabilities of the 
intervener, and the type of conflict, among others.  Again, much like the intervention decision 
literature, there has been no analysis of how the domestic political characteristics and institutions 
of the intervener can impact the likelihood of successful intervention efforts.  I believe that both 
the decision to intervene and the probability of a successful intervention could very well be 
linked and better understood within the context of how domestic policy preferences can impact 
foreign policy decisions.  If we are to believe that a realist paradigm still dominates the thought 
processes of policy makers with regard to foreign policy decisions, then the questions that I will 
address and the theories I will propose probably have no place in the literature.  However, if we 
are inclined to believe that a realist paradigm fails at some level to explain these intervention 
processes then my approach to understanding these processes is not only relevant, but unique in 
its approach.  The following example should help to clarify how domestic audience costs could 
be linked to both.   
1.2 Domestic Politics in Intervention Processes  
Following the departure of Siad Barre from Somalia in January 1991 the central 
government of the eastern African country collapsed and violent conflict between the countries 
various clans began occurring with increasing frequency.  Compounding these problems was a 
persistent drought that rendered the state unable to provide food for its already 
beleagueredcitizens.  Although several private organizations attempted to assist the citizens by 
providing food to the famine stricken population, securing these stores was difficult at best.  In 
April 1992, the United Nations authorized UNOSOM.  It was intended to be a peacekeeping 
mission that would organize food distribution and coordinate the relief efforts in country.  
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However, neither these private organizations nor the UN mission could effectively coordinate 
this distribution as relief supplies moved further from the major population centers (Stewart 
2002).   
Increasingly, news coverage of the unfolding crisis began appearing on televisions 
throughout U.S. households.  As the situation continued to deteriorate, pressure was mounting on 
President George H. W. Bush to make a more direct U.S. commitment to the relief operations.  
In August 1992 President Bush authorized Operation Provide Relief.  The primary mission of the 
operation was to airlift supplies into Somalia’s interior regions and conduct surveillance of the 
situation on the ground (Allard 1995).  However, because the mission did not provide for 
securing relief supplies once on the ground, looting of these supplies by the warring factions 
continued.   If U.S. forces were not deployed to ensure delivery of these supplies to their 
appropriate destinations, it appeared that widespread famine would be imminent.   
Operation RESTORE HOPE was intended to provide security for the supply chains as 
well as broker truces among the competing Somali clans.  It established secure sectors on the 
ground for relief supplies to travel through and maintained a fragile peace among the clans.  The 
mission was largely successful, and mass starvation was temporarily avoided.  However, once 
the situation on the ground stabilized, United Nations diplomats began to press for an objective 
beyond the scope of the initial mission including confiscating weapons and pressing for a much 
needed but difficult to attain political settlement (Stewart 2002).   
 In response to these expanded mission goals the U.S. (in addition to other nations) 
reacted by increasing their military presence in Somalia under UNOSOM II.  Complicating 
matters was the fact that while previous missions had been specifically aimed at peacekeeping, 
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the new mission expanded the role of the armed forces to include a peace enforcing component.  
While many Somalis had initially welcomed the assistance of the U.S. and others when the 
primary goal was that of ensuring aid distribution, military involvement in the political 
settlement proved to be less welcome.  Resistance to the peace enforcing mission grew within the 
country and soon U.S. and coalition forces found themselves conducting extensive combat 
operations throughout Somalia.  Of particular interest to the U.S. was the apprehension of 
General Mohamed Farrah Hassan Aidid, leader of the Somalia National Alliance.   
 Throughout 1993, combat operations continued at an increasing pace while searching for 
Aidid and assaulting key locations of strategic importance to the Somalia National Alliance.  Of 
particular note was a deployment of Joint Special Operation Task Force Ranger.  Its specific 
mission was to track down Aidid and his command structure and turn them over to the United 
Nations for prosecution.   In October 1993, TF Ranger attempted to move into a sector of 
Mogadishu known to be a stronghold of Aidid’s.  The initial raid lasted 2 days.TF Ranger saw 16 
soldiers killed and 57 wounded including pilots, passengers, and exfiltration teams involved in 
the “Blackhawk Down” (Stewart 2002).  Shortly after the raid, images of the soldiers’ bodies 
being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu began appearing on American television.   
What had begun as a relief mission evolved into a series of bloody raids that claimed the 
lives of dozens of American servicemen.  Americans, horrified at the brutal consequences of this 
intervention, began withdrawing support for continued efforts to enforce a political solution.  
Subsequently, President Clinton ordered the withdrawal of American forces from Somalia and 
by March of 1995 all U.S. forces were withdrawn from the country.  Despite the best efforts of 
several nations, Somalia continued to exist as a failed state after intervention forces withdrew. 
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 Popular sentiment to assist the ailing Somali state appear to be one of the driving forces that led 
to increasing U.S. involvement in that civil war. The war had begun in 1991 and its devastating 
effect on the population was compounded by severe drought onset that very same year.  By 1992 
the plight of the Somali people in general and the deteriorating situation in Mogadishu in 
particular was quickly becoming public knowledge.  Images and stories of the starving ,war 
ravaged population began to be distributed by various media outlets.  By this time volunteer aid 
organizations were rapidly becoming unable to provide the assistance needed by the Somali 
people.  As public awareness of the Somali peoples’ predicament came to light, public pressure 
in the United States to assist the Somali people began to mount.  In late 1992 nearly a third of the 
domestic U.S. population was following the situation in Somalia.  By early 1993 estimates of 
domestic U.S. awareness of the situation had reached nearly 90%.     
The question of why the U.S. and others failed to successfully intervene now becomes the 
relevant question.  Much of the current literature on civil war intervention would conclude that 
the internal dynamics of the conflict were the reasons behind a lack of success on the part of the 
interveners.  In the Somali example, the existence of many competing factions engaging in 
increasingly violent conflict could have forced policy makers to come to the conclusion that 
continued involvement would be futile. Certainly, the internal situation in Somalia was difficult.  
However, I am unconvinced that the characteristics of the conflict were the only factors leading 
to this unsuccessful attempt at intervention.  It appears that domestic political pressure in the 
United States led U.S. policy makers to intervene in the conflict.  Additionally, I would argue 
that this same domestic pressure led to a premature withdrawal of forces.  
Being a superpower with unmatched military resources, the United States could have 
further entrenched itself in the conflict.  The addition of more ground forces along with sustained 
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air and naval support would have, I believe, eventually resulted in the capture of Aidid, the 
defeat of his supporters, and ultimately a successful intervention.  This type of sustained effort 
had the potential to help encourage and enforce a stable political settlement.  It was not that the 
United States lacked the material resources to do so.  Instead policy makers lost the support of 
the population for continuing intervention in what appeared to be a conflict that would 
increasingly become difficult to successfully intervene in.   
It is possible that the internal characteristics of conflict contribute not only the reluctance 
of states to intervene, but the failure of intervening states’ achieving their goals as well.  An 
alternative explanation is that the domestic political characteristics of an intervener not only 
affect a state’s decision to intervene, but also make it difficult for particular regime types to 
successfully achieve their intervention objectives.  This alternative explanation is one which the 
current literature on civil war intervention fails to address.  The lack of inquiry with regard to 
whether or not regime type has any bearing on the decision to intervene and the outcomes of 
interventions leads me to believe that our understanding of these processes is incomplete.  
Addressing these questions will enhance our understanding of interventions as well as the 
reasons for their success or failure. That is the purpose of this dissertation and, to my knowledge, 
the first attempt to answer whether or not domestic audiences can influence both the decision to 
intervene and whether those interventions are likely to be successful.   
I will argue that the current intervention literature has failed to adequately examine the 
role of regime type as it relates to both the decision to intervene and the ultimate success or 
failure of those interventions.  Specifically, the literature has failed to address how regime type 
and domestic audiences might influence the intervention process.  Domestic political pressure 
affects the intervention process in two ways.  First, domestic audiences can pressure policy 
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makers into intervening in conflicts in which successful intervention is difficult to realize.  
Additionally, once the intervention is underway, negative domestic sentiment regarding the 
mission will force leaders to withdraw forces prior to successful completion of the objective.  
The novelty of the theory is in the linkage of initiation and success via domestic audience costs.  
The domestic pressure placed on democratic leaders has the potential not only to influence 
initiation, but could lead policy makers to intervene in civil wars where the odds of success are 
relatively remote.   
My proposal is that democratic societies force policy makers into more intractable 
conflicts.  If this assertion can be empirically observed, it would certainly add to the literature on 
civil wars and intervention.  In contrast to the realist paradigm that so often dominates our 
approach to international relations, this research has the potential to indicate that domestic 
politics can in fact have a significant impact on foreign policy decisions under conditions in 
which the intervener’s national interests are not necessarily threatened.  In fact, this domestic 
pressure will lead to policies that have the potential to lead policy makers to make sub-optimal 
foreign policy decisions.  That is, the policy preferences of domestic populations and policy 
makers my not reflect one another.  While policy makers determine that a particular intervention 
is not in the best interests of the state, uninformed publics will, through political pressure, 
encourage these policy makers to undertake the intervention in spite of policy makers’ 
misgivings about the need for and potential success of that intervention.  
I believe that while democracies undertake the decision to intervene in a fashion similar 
to their non-democratic counterparts, particular democratic institutions and norms complicate the 
intervention decision process. Democracies are also potentially limited as to how vigorously they 
pursue an intervention strategy once operations have begun.  Domestic pressure can and do force 
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nations into more intractable conflicts while subsequently tying the hands of policy makers once 
an intervention has been initiated.   I suspect that this is one of the primary reasons that 
democracies, while highly successful in interstate conflicts, fare far worse when intervening in 
another state’s civil war.  I intend to develop a regime based theory of the intervention process 
that seeks to explain why democracies have the potential to engage in risky interventions.  I will 
also attempt to connect regime characteristics to the failure or success of those interventions by 
showing that the same domestic political forces that encourage intervention also serve to 
expedite terminations of missions prior to success being realized.   
1.3 Conclusion  
In the chapters that follow I plan to address questions related to the role of a potential 
intervener’s regime type influencing the decision to intervene, the effect that domestic pressure 
has on the ability of an intervener to be successful, and how these two processes are ultimately 
linked through the prism of domestic politics.  Chapter 2 begins by reviewing the relevant 
literature on civil war intervention with a focus on the motivations for intervention.  This will 
primarily focus on the conflict characteristics and why they might induce a third party to 
intervene in a civil war.  This chapter will also review the intervention decision literature.  In this 
section I will pay particularly close attention to the differences between democracies and non-
democracies.  It is the variation in ability to resist or avoid negative public reaction to policy that 
I argue shapes both the intervention decision and likelihood of successful intervention.  In 
chapter 3 I will tie research related to the intervention decision process and regime type together 
to form my theoretical arguments on intervention initiation.  Specifically, I will argue that 
variations in media effects and population characteristics differentiate democracies from 
autocracies in the intervention decision process. Later, I will unify these theories by 
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demonstrating how both processes can be linked via regime type and the associated domestic 
audience costs.  The result of this discussion should allow me to develop a decision theoretic 
approach to intervention initiation and success related to regime type.  Chapter 4 will be 
dedicated to empirical examination of whether or not domestic audience costs and pressure can 
influence policy makers into intervening in civil wars.  Moreover, I will show evidence that 
domestic pressure will lead policy makers to intervene in conflicts in which the likelihood of 
success is relatively low.  Specifically I plan to provide evidence that democratic states are more 
likely than non-democracies to engage in risky interventions that result in higher than expected 
failure rates.   In this chapter I will also determine if domestic audience costs lead to premature 
intervention termination.    I intend to determine whether these difficult cases are also examples 
of a situation in which domestic political pressure leads to mission termination prior to achieving 
a successful outcome.  This chapter will attempt to empirically tie intervention initiation and 
success together.  Finally, in chapter 5, I will further discuss the implications of my findings and 
suggest alternative avenues of research related to the dissertation.
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CHAPTER 2: INTERVENTION AND SUCCESS 
2.1 Types of Intervention 
Generally speaking, three major forms of intervention can be identified.  The first, and 
least costly to the intervening state, is diplomatic intervention.  This could include an offer to 
help the warring factions negotiate a settlement by acting as a mediator.  Because the costs of 
diplomatic intervention could be considered nominal at best, I will not include them in my 
forthcoming analysis.  The second is economic intervention.  An example of this might include 
sanctions against the existing government of the target state, thus limiting the ability of that 
government to engage in economic exchange.  This imposes a cost not only to the target country, 
but also to the intervener by limiting the potential revenue to the intervener from the sale of 
goods and services to the target country.  Conversely, the intervener could decide to cease 
purchasing exports from the target country thereby denying the target country access to the 
intervener’s markets and reducing the amount of capital to which the target country has access.  
The intervening party might also wish to affect the situation by providing aid to one or another 
side engaged in the conflict in order to sway the conflict in favor of a particular side. 
The third type of intervention is the military option.  This could take one of several 
different forms at varying costs to the third party.  The first might be to send arms to one of the 
factions.  A second might be to send in military advisors to the target state to assist a particular 
side with the training of troops.  Another variation could include sending combat troops to the 
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target states to help shift the balance of power.  In 1969, James Rosenau attempted to formulate a 
working definition for intervention.  He defines intervention as both “convention breaking” and 
“authority oriented.”  By this he means that the conventional behavior of interaction between the 
respective states (the intervener and the target state) must be changed in some fashion.  
Furthermore, the intervening state must intend to affect the authority structure of the 
corresponding state.  That is to say that the intervening state must have some intention to affect 
the structure of government authority either by stabilizing the existing power structure or 
changing it (Rosenau 1968).   
For the purposes of this dissertation, I will not be considering diplomatic intervention.  
Diplomatic intervention entails minimal if any measurable cost being borne by the intervener.   I 
will argue that that the potential and realized cost of intervention impact democratic public 
opinion and that public opinion has the potential to drive civil war processes.  Because 
diplomatic intervention does not impose significant cost to the intervener, I feel that it does not 
necessarily have a place in my theory. 
  Interventions into internal wars in foreign countries are nearly always wars of choice.  
Generally, states have no obligation to intervene in civil wars.  There are exceptions of course.  
For example, preexisting military pacts could compel to the alliance partner to intervene.  Huth 
(1998) found that if the target state and the intervener had a preexisting military pact, then 
intervention in a civil war was more likely.  This is not to suggest that states will intervene, but 
rather that they are only more likely to do so.  States tend to approach the decision to intervene in 
another’s internal conflict much as they would when considering entering into an interstate 
conflict.  In both cases successful realization of objectives and costs related to engagement are of 
paramount importance in the decision making process.  If policy makers calculate that the odds 
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of success are low and the potential cost for failure are high, they will likely attempt to avoid 
becoming involved in a conflict.  
Conversely, if the potential for success is high and the cost for failure is low, states 
should be more inclined to engage in conflict.  This basic cost benefit analysis can help 
determine which conflicts states will choose to engage in.  I believe the effect of this analysis is 
even more pronounced in relation to civil wars.  Interstate wars are not always wars of choice.  A 
state has the potential to be attacked by another in the international system.  In these cases it may 
or may not make sense for a state to fight.  Capitulation may be the best choice.  In contrast civil 
war intervention, as stated earlier, nearly always allows the potential intervener to choose 
whether or not to intervene.   To be clear, this does not suggest that states will seek out any and 
all opportunities to intervene or seek out wars to engage in.  There should be some compelling 
interest beyond the mere opportunity of achieving an easy victory or successful intervention.  
While civil wars are frequently considered to be internal affairs, the reality is that they have the 
potential to impact both neighboring states as well as the global political system.  Given that the 
ramifications of these conflicts can extend beyond the conflicted state’s borders, it stands to 
reason that external states will wish to influence the outcome of another state’s civil war.  States 
will take many factors into consideration when deciding whether or not they will intervene.   
2.2 Motivations for Intervention 
2.2.1 Population Dislocation, Contagion, and Ethnicity  
Civil wars have been found to disrupt societies by forcing refugees across national 
borders (Collier et. al, 2003) and damaging social programs within the state in conflict (Lai and 
Thyne 2007).  This movement of refugees is particularly troubling for neighboring states which 
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experience economic repercussions related to diversion of resources to address refugee issues 
(Holl 1993; Siverson and Star 1991; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006).  States neighboring those in 
conflict also typically experience a dip in their economic growth due to disrupted trade flow 
(Murdoch and Sandler 2002).  Others theories posit that population movements are a primary 
reason underlying the spread of conflicts across regions due to the fact that “refugee flows may 
facilitate the transnational spread of arms, combatants, and ideologies conducive to conflict; they 
alter the ethnic composition of the state; and they can exacerbate economic competition 
(Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006).   
Additionally, refugees flowing from the civil war into bordering states could constitute a 
major health concern for the regional community.  Civil wars tend to be breeding grounds for a 
variety of different health hazards (Ghoborah, Huth, and Russett 2003).  Civil wars do 
extraordinary damage to the public health systems of a country by draining resources available to 
apply to healthcare systems and exposing the local populations to pathogens well as other 
dangers.  Women and children are the most likely to be affected by a collapse of the healthcare 
infrastructure and they also constitute the populations most likely to become refugees 
(Ghoborah, Huth, and Russett 2003).  Thus beyond the economic burden that comes with refugee 
flows, the spread of communicable diseases such as malaria HIV/AIDS represent a secondary 
concern of neighboring states (Montalvo and Reynal- Querol 2005; Collier et. al 2003). 
Given these potential dangers, states in the immediate bordering nations might very well 
be highly inclined to intervene.  Civil wars have detrimental effects on neighboring countries.  
First, the potential for “contagion” is high (Regan 2000).  That is, the fighting would not be 
contained within the borders of the conflicted country. Kathman (2010) observed that when the 
infection risk to third party neighbors increased so too did the likelihood that they would 
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intervene.  Additionally, “ethnic affinities” in cross-border communities will generally be higher 
than in those environments where large distances separate ethnic groups, generating domestic 
constituencies that influence the decision-making process.”   
2.2.2 The Geography of Conflict 
Why then should a study that focuses on regime type and intervention processes consider 
refugee flows, contagion, and ethnic ties?  One interesting feature of democracies is that they 
tend to cluster.  Most are clustered in Western Europe and the Americas.  Interestingly, most 
civil wars occur in the Middle East, Africa and Southeast Asia.  In these areas, democracy is not 
nearly as prevalent.  If a civil war erupts, it is much more likely that the neighboring states are 
not democracies.  Yet we continue to observe democracies intervening in states within the 
aforementioned regions.  It should be fairly evident that most democratic states are minimally at 
risk of experiencing these mass flows of refugees.  Thus, when considering intervention, it does 
not necessarily appear that the refugee flows would be part of the intervention decision calculus.  
Other geographic considerations could certainly be taken into account when a state is deciding 
on whether or not to intervene.  One finding was that great powers are much more likely to 
intervene in distant conflicts (Pearson1974).   
When considering the geographic clustering of democratic regimes, democracies are less 
likely to experience civil wars themselves and their neighbors are more likely to be democracies.  
Therefore it makes sense that the opportunity to intervene would exist at some distance from 
their borders due to the fact that civil wars are less likely to happen in regions inhabited by 
democracies.  However, it should be noted that distant conflicts necessarily entail higher costs 
related to the intervention.  Planning for the logistical difficulties posed by engaging in an 
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intervention farther from a states power base is more difficult and the effort is more costly.  Due 
to the fact that as costs for intervening increase as the intervener extends from its power base, the 
potential for successful intervention decreases (Regan 2000).  Therefore, we should see 
geographically insulated states more hesitant to engage in distant conflicts.  This is particularly 
true of democratic regimes who typically display more caution in choosing which conflicts to 
engage in.  However, we often observe democratic regimes entering into these conflicts despite 
the added cost of intervening from a distance (Regan 1996).  My theory is that some civil wars 
have particular characteristics that peak the interests of domestic political audiences in 
democratic states.  If these audiences have the ability to influence policy makers to intervene in 
civil wars that have no direct bearing on the national interests of the intervening state, then this 
might provide at least a partial explanation as to why third parties will intervene.  
2.3 Conditions for Successful Intervention  
While the previous literature clearly indicates that third parties feel compelled to engage 
in interventions in order to stem the negative consequences of civil wars, they must also calculate 
the probability that their intervention will be successful.  One of the basic assumptions made by 
policy makers when considering intervention is the probable success of the endeavor.  How then 
should we define success?  One widely accepted proposition is that intervening states will act in 
order to encourage the fighting to come to an end (Regan 1996).  That is, the cessation of 
hostilities and the stabilization of the conflicted state will be the primary goal of the intervention.  
This is not to say that other motivations should not be considered.  For example, the intervening 
state might wish to become engaged in the conflict for a variety of other reasons.  The 
intervening state could have an interest in exploiting the conflict for its own benefit.  By 
intervening the state may be able to make territorial gains for itself.  Another goal may be to help 
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ensure regional stability by limiting the spread of the conflict to other nations.  Alternatively, the 
intervening state could have particular ties to a country in conflict which would necessitate 
interventionist behavior to ensure that the status quo is not upset.  For the purposes of this paper, 
I intend to define success as intervention which serves to cease hostilities and stabilize the 
conflicted region.  Under this definition, it makes no difference which party in the conflict, if 
any, an intervener supports. 
2.3.1 Conflict Characteristics 
Beyond defining success, how do the characteristics of the conflict affect the likelihood 
of a successful intervention?   Particularly intense conflicts with high casualty rates prior to an 
intervention are factors that affect the probability of success.  Given that the internal parties to 
the conflict have already expended significant resources, such as blood and treasure, it is unlikely 
that less costly forms of intervention, such as economic incentives to end the fighting would be 
sufficient to bring the conflict to an end.  Rather a more significant form of intervention, for 
example a large and costly military intervention, could be necessary to achieve the intervener’s 
goal.  Additionally, high casualty rates will often entrench the opposing sides in their effort.  
They become more resolved to continue the fight to the end given that each has invested much in 
their campaigns already.  These considerations could lead one to believe that intense and 
protracted conflicts are among the most difficult to successfully intervene in, and are thus less 
likely to experience an intervention (Regan 1996).   
 The nature of the conflict must also be considered.  Different civil wars have different 
causes and the variation in these causes leads to differing degrees of intractability.  Fearon 
(2004) examined various types of civil wars and how their typology affects the duration of the 
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conflict.  Several categories seem to be able to be resolved relatively quickly.  Coups, popular 
revolutions, wars of decolonization, and conflicts in post-cold war Eastern Europe tend to be 
short lived.  In contrast, “sons of the soil” (Weiner 1978) conflicts tend to last much longer.  
These conflicts are characterized by an ethnic majority moving populations from their traditional 
territorial base into the periphery of the state.  The migrants, supported by state development 
projects, push traditional inhabitants of these areas out of their traditional land base.  This forced 
(or encouraged) migration often leads to the secondarily displaced populations deciding to push 
back against the state and those that migrated into territory that was historically controlled by the 
peripheral population.   
Unlike the previous conflict types, these conflicts tend to have quite a bit more staying 
power.  Additionally, intrastate conflicts that result from conflicting ideologies are particularly 
difficult to end.  Whereas disputes over autonomy of populations may be able to be resolved in a 
relatively straightforward manner, ideological differences have a way of hardening the resolve of 
the conflicting parties.  When the resolution to the conflict involves one side abandoning its 
ideological base, that side must also concede claims to sovereignty (Regan 1996).  Because the 
issues at stake are less tangible in these conflicts, relative to ethnic and religious conflicts, both 
competing sides will be more unwilling to concede their position making outside intervention 
much more difficult.  The point of the previous discussion is to illustrate that not only do the 
reasons for intervention vary, but the likelihood of a successful intervention also varies 
depending on conflict characteristics.   
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2.3.2 The Intervention Cost Calculus 
Intervention options have associated costs.  Regan’s expected utility model for 
intervention addresses these costs as well as other factors third parties consider when choosing to 
intervene.  First, decision makers must consider whether or not the intervention, no matter the 
goal of that intervention, will be successful.  Let us assume the following case that he puts forth.  
“If there were two identical interventions – in terms of human and material costs—and one 
succeeded and the other failed, we would expect the political costs of failure to surpass those 
associated with the successful policy (Regan 1998).  In other words, interveners take into 
consideration the nature of the conflict and the potential costs-benefit outcomes when deciding 
whether or not to intervene.  Intervention is a costly course of action for states.  Large quantities 
of material resources are required to undertake such action.  This is particularly true of military 
intervention.  Troops must be diverted from other theaters and this movement can strain the 
logistic capacity of the intervening state.  Thus, there is an economic cost to intervention that 
they would avoid bearing by avoiding involvement in another states internal conflict.  Beyond 
economic costs, intervention can impose a human cost on states.  Intervening raises that 
probability that these troops will become casualties of the conflict.  Given the disposition of the 
intervening states population, the realization that their fellow citizens might be killed during a 
conflict can impact them negatively.  Thus, the possibility of political backlash to the 
intervention decision is a real political danger to policy makers.   
2.4 Democracies and Conflict  
Are democracies more capable of avoiding conflict with a high probability of a negative 
outcome?  Some research has appeared to support the idea that generally democracies are less 
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prone to go to war (Babst 1972; Rummel 1983).  More recent research has helped to dispel the 
notion that democracies are less war prone.  While democracies do not tend to fight one another, 
democratic states are as likely to be involved in military conflict as frequently as other regime 
types (Levy 1982). The decision to go to war is ultimately made by a state’s political leaders 
(Domke 1988) whether they be democratic or of another type.  When the potential for political 
consequences related to entering a conflict are limited, then leaders should be more willing to do 
so.  However, if there are negative foreseeable consequences that follow a decision to engage in 
a conflict, leaders should be less willing to engage in behavior that could harm them politically.  
Leaders in democratic states will necessarily be more loath to make hasty decisions to go to war 
due to the fact that they attain and maintain power through the consent of the governed, who will 
necessarily incur the cost of conflict, they can be held accountable for unpopular or faulty 
decision making politically.   We should view the decision to intervene in a state’s civil war in 
much the same light.  Both interstate and intrastate conflicts can have positive or negative 
political consequences for leaders in democratic states.  When successful policies are enacted, 
policy makers are rewarded.  However, if they fail to achieve a stated objective (e.g. losing a 
war, failing to successfully intervene) the potential for negative political consequences is 
heightened. 
2.4.1 Institutional Constraints in Democracies 
It is not that simply being a democratic regime makes a state less likely to go to war but, 
rather the structure of democratic regimes that allow citizens and other groups within democratic 
states to constrain the actions of heads of state.  Other proponents of the institutional constraints 
argument (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Russet 1993) argue that democratic institutions 
allow for the organization and mobilization of opposition groups which will no doubt take 
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advantage of the vulnerability of elites that embark upon frivolous, expensive, or failed foreign 
policy (e.g. war).  Because there is often competition waiting in the wings, going to war has the 
potential to increase dissatisfaction among the electorate which can encourage them to replace 
parties or leaders who engage in failed policies thereby making the current regime more risk 
averse. In contrast, nondemocratic leaders do not face such prospects given the authoritarian 
nature of their regimes.  
Democratic institutions also help to decentralize decision-making power allowing groups 
that are more conflict averse to impede actions that may lead to conflict (Morgan and Campbell 
1991).  These lines of reasoning suggest that leaders in democratic societies have a less incentive 
to go to war given the risks associated with doing than authoritarian governments.  There is also 
an informational component related to states and their willingness to go to war that is derived 
from the crisis bargaining literature. When complete information exists about the intentions of 
both parties in a crisis then it becomes easier for the parties to come to an agreement as to what 
settlement would be acceptable to both and thus avoid the need to incur the cost of engaging in 
armed conflict in order to resolve the dispute.   However, because opposing sides of an issue 
maintain diverging interests, they will be inclined to hold information in order to potentially 
achieve a better deal than they would have under conditions of complete information.  Audience 
costs can help explain why certain regime types can more credibly signal their intentions. 
Democratic leaders face both internal and external costs when signaling intentions. 
Fearon (1994) develops a bargaining model to emphasize the importance of public opinion in the 
decision making process.  Democracies, because of their political structure, face higher costs 
than do non-democracies and are therefore compelled to send credible signals during times of 
crises. Democratic leaders are particularly vulnerable to audience costs related to national honor 
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(Mercer 1996) in that if they reveal false intentions and retreat from their stated position they 
will incur audience costs both domestically and internationally.  Thus, there is an international 
cost to backtracking resulting is loss of credibility among peers in the international community.  
There is also a domestic cost associated with bluffing.  Democratic leaders who engage in this 
behavior often face skepticism about their ability to effectively govern from the domestic 
populations.  Additionally, political opponents will likely seize the opportunity to mount a 
political front in opposition to leaders that sully the national honor of the state (Fearon 1994; 
Schultz 1998).   
Non-democracies have less to fear from engaging in bluffing behavior as they are not as 
accountable to their populations and often encounter little viable political opposition.  Therefore, 
when audience costs are potentially high regimes are likely to send credible signals indicating 
their resolve related to their stated bargaining position.  Furthermore, the presence of strong 
political opposition can serve to provide additional confirmation of the regimes stated intentions 
(Schultz 1999).  Another common component of democratic systems of government is the 
existence of a free press.  A minimally restricted press corps can further confirm whether or not 
democratic regimes are resolute in their stated intentions and can transmit this information to 
external parties (Siegel 1997).   These institutions can lead to greater transparency regarding a 
government’s intentions help to solve the problems arising from incomplete information during 
the bargaining process.  It could be assumed that democratic populations have much greater 
access to government transparency.  They also have the potential to know more about the world 
in general given the prevalence of these press corps.  Once democratic populations have 
knowledge of external events they have the opportunity to voice their opinions as to what the 
appropriate course of action might be.  It is the variation in audience costs related to political 
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decisions and the availability of information that helps explain why democracies and non-
democracies choose to intervene in some conflicts while avoiding others.   
2.4.2 Audience Costs 
Democratic regimes are particularly responsive to public opinion.  The potential for 
negative consequences stemming from a decision to intervene in another state’s civil war could 
dissuade democratic leaders from interventions.  However, the opposite seems to be the case.  
Throughout the last four decades it is democratic regimes that have been the most active in civil 
war interventions.  Apart from regime type and the audience costs influencing the decision to 
enter into a conflict, they can help to explain probable outcomes of particular types of wars.  My 
theory is that initiation and success are linked by domestic politics.  Public sentiment can be a 
powerful impetus for democratic policy makers to intervene in conflicts in which the public 
perceives a compelling reason for action.   This decision by the initiator is considered “self 
selection” (Gartner and Siverson 1996, Reiter and Stam 2002).  One can assume that state 
leaders will take into account their chances of winning any conflict that they enter.  A further 
assumption is that once a particular likelihood of success has been subjectively established by the 
potential initiator they will have a better understanding of whether or not to intervene in a 
particular conflict.  As this likelihood of success increases so too does the likelihood of initiation.  
However, when domestic political pressure exists, the decision calculus becomes somewhat 
more complicated.   
Earlier research indicates that leaders who enter into conflicts and fail face negative 
political repercussions, most notably removal from office (Reiter and Stam 2002).  The fear of 
this outcome is not without warrant.  Unlike autocratic or anocratic governments which have the 
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power to repress populations and maintain their hold on power, democratic regimes are 
particularly sensitive to how policy decisions will affect their perception among the democratic 
population.  While the early research indicates that war loss leads to regimes being ousted more 
quickly and more frequently than other types (Beuno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995), more 
recent analysis appears to indicate that systematic removal of democratic leaders who fail to 
achieve their foreign policy goals is not nearly as prevalent as once thought (Chiozza and 
Goemans 2004).   
This might appear to undercut my argument regarding audience costs being calculated in 
the intervention initiation process.  However, this is not necessarily the case.  This more recent 
research only indicates that systematic removal of democratic leaders from office is not as likely 
following the failure of a military campaign.  It does not speak to the perception that democratic 
leaders have regarding the potential political consequences of failure.  They can still feel 
constrained by domestic institutions and public opinion even in the face of evidence that suggests 
dire political consequences are unlikely.  While removal from office following a failed 
intervention may be rare, this failure can erode a population’s faith policy makers’ ability to 
make sound judgments both foreign and domestic. 
2.4.3 Information and the Cost of Conflict  
Autocratic regimes can, at least theoretically, be more willing to engage in risky wars.  If 
their internal security structures are robust enough repress any negative reaction to defeat, then 
they can effectively negate audience costs.  In contrast, democratic regimes are not often 
afforded this option.  Thus, democratic leaders have a lower threshold for negative political 
consequences when their foreign policy fails.  Democratic leaders are much more particular 
24 
 
about what types of war they choose to engage in.  Research seems to indicate that democracies 
are much better at determining which conflicts lend themselves to success.  Domestic audience 
costs, political opposition and veto players, and a free press are components of democratic 
regimes that help guide leaders through the war initiation process.  Democratic institutions tend 
to produce higher quality information regarding the political costs related to intervention than do 
non-democracies (Reiter and Stam 1998a).  For example, open forums for debate related to 
policy choices serve to uncover faulty assumptions about the level of support for war.  The 
presence of political opposition, which can use the press as a forum for debating the quality of 
decisions, is also characteristic of democratic regimes (Snyder 1991; Van Evera 1994).  Media 
coverage of a policy decision would necessarily expose that policy to public scrutiny and thus 
potential audience costs.  If the relevant public in opposition to the policy is significant enough, 
then choosing and unpopular policy could lead to audience costs for the policy makers who fail 
to recognize and react to public opinion.   
Democratic military institutions are also more likely to present quality information on the 
chances of winning a conflict whereas these same institutions in non-democracies are either 
unwilling or unable to provide clear direction to leaders regarding military affairs (Pollack 1996).  
Additionally, democracies tend to have more competent and less biased bureaucratic institutions 
that can even handedly evaluate the implications of policy decision (Reiter 1998a).  In contrast, it 
can be observed that autocrats will often surround themselves with individuals that wish to stay 
in the good graces of those that they serve.  Dissent and proposal of alternative courses of actions 
related to policy are discouraged and often punished severely.  One recent example of this 
phenomenon is Iraq under Saddam Hussein’s regime.  During his tenure as the leader of Iraq, he 
undertook two military campaigns that resulted in disaster for the state: the Iran Iraq war from 
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1980-1988 and the 1990 Gulf War against the United States.  In both cases his subordinates 
failed to accurately predict and inform him of the duration and cost of these conflicts, possibly 
due to fear that disagreeing with Hussein would lead to demotion or some other form of 
punishment.   
Democratic leaders typically do not have the ability to maintain as dominant a position 
regarding policy decisions that many non-democratic leaders do. Advisory boards to these 
leaders are typically made up, in part, of career bureaucrats who benefit from a greater degree of 
insulation from retribution if their views conflict with those of political leaders. All of these 
factors lead to democratic regimes being able to more accurately identify which conflict should 
be avoided.  Democratic regimes also seek to identify the lowest cost wars to enter into both in 
financial and human capital when possible.  Democracies typically fight in less bloody conflicts 
due to shorter wars (Bennett and Stam 1996, 1998).  They also tend to engage in lower-cost wars 
(Siverson 1995).  This is partially related to audience costs.  Increased expenditures can lead to 
greater rent seeking behavior by the government conducting military operations.  This need not 
be strictly monetary in nature.  It is true that as the costs of a conflict increase fewer resources 
can be used to address needs of the state unrelated to the conflict.   
However, when we consider costs we must also look at the cost in lives of those that a 
state commits to a conflict.  We must look back to audience cost to help explain why this is the 
case.  Democratic populations are sensitive to casualties and conflict fatigue.  They are not 
necessarily any more sensitive to them than populations under other regime types, but they have 
an opportunity to express their grievances to which democratically elected officials will be 
unlikely to ignore.  As the casualty count rises, so too does opposition to war in democratic 
populations.  It is not necessarily a function of how many total casualties exist for any intervener 
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but rather a rapidly accelerating rate of casualties that accounts for a decline in public support 
(Gartner and Segura 1998).  For these reasons we see democratic regimes initiating war under 
only certain conditions: short, low cost wars where the odds of victory are relatively high.  This 
ability to correctly assess the potential costs associated with conflict is one explanation for the 
success of democratic regimes (Reiter and Stam 2002).  The reasons behind these accurate 
calculations relate to the institutions inherent to democratic political systems.   
Generally, initiators of conflict hold an advantage when it comes to winning conflict 
(Bueno de Mesquita 1981).  However, there is some indication that democracies, unlike other 
regime types need not take advantage of striking the initial blow in order to assure victory.  
There have been several different hypotheses as to why this is the case.  I will examine two 
different schools of thought related to why democracies are more able to win wars relative to 
other regime types.  The first school (war fighting) establishes a rent seeking model to explain 
why democracies fare better in war.  It asserts that democracies are better at waging war for three 
distinct reasons.  First, democracies seek lower rents from their populations leading to greater 
economic wealth which supports superior war fighting capability.  Second, democracies will 
form formal or informal alliances to assist each other.  Finally, they can expect that their 
populations can more easily be rallied to provide support for the war fighting effort (Lake 1992).   
While at first glance this reasoning seems to provide a logical way forward in explaining 
democratic dominance in conflict, the model does have some shortcomings.  Fewer rents derived 
from the population lead to a relative decline in the available resources available for efficient war 
fighting.  Furthermore there is no guarantee that democracy leads to greater economic wealth 
(Przeworski and Limongi 1997).  Although overwhelming democratic coalitions are 
hypothesized in the model to be a determinant of democratic victory, the data to support that 
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conclusion is lacking (Reiter and Stam 1998a).  However, there does seem to be some credibility 
to the claim that democracies are better able garner support for war efforts among their 
populations (Levi 1997).   
Not only are democracies more able than non-democracies in building domestic support 
for war efforts, but democracies also hold an advantage on the battlefield.   Most of the existing 
literature seems to indicate that there is little evidence that soldiers fighting for democratic 
regimes fight harder based on an adherence to a particular political ideology.  The results of most 
studies are mixed at best.  However, there are certain aspects of democratic culture that do lend 
themselves to greater war fighting effectiveness.  One characteristic of democratic militaries is 
that they tend to field more talented military leaders.   As opposed to the militaries in non-
democracies, democratic military leadership is often more adept in assuring that the troops that 
they command adhere to a general battleplan.  One possible reason for this is that the leadership 
structure of most democratic militaries is not dominated by individuals who belong to a 
particular social class or ethnic group.  Rather, they are drawn from the general population.  This 
leads to fewer instances of class or ethnic cleavages that could serve to undermine the authority 
of military leaders, thus increasing the likelihood that when orders are given they are executed 
more readily (Rosen 1991).   
While the military hierarchy in democracies tends to be more stable, this does not means 
that soldiers are altogether barred from exhibiting individuality on the battlefield.  One 
characteristic of superior leadership is the recognition that, while military commanders are 
generally best suited to make tactical and strategic decisions, they are not always in a position to 
make the correct battlefield decision.  Often, particularly at the tactical level, individual soldiers 
or small groups of soldiers are in the superior position to determine what the best course of 
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action is given the particulars of the operation at hand.  Individualism is a characteristics 
emphasized by many democracies (to one degree or another).  Therefore, it is unsurprising that 
soldiers would display this characteristic when engaging in war fighting activities and that this 
trait would be encouraged to some degree by military leadership (Pollack 1996).   
Democratic militaries also exhibit greater organizational effectiveness.  Nondemocratic 
leaders often have much to fear from their own military services relative to democratic leaders.  
Many have themselves come into power by way of military coup and recognize that the same 
fate could befall them if they do not take steps to prevent it.  Many times, nondemocratic leaders 
will attempt to insulate themselves from internal challenges by promoting those who exhibit high 
levels of loyalty to the regime or move them from one position to another to avoid these 
individuals cultivating close ties to those they command (Tullock 1987).  This may or may not 
lead to having the most talented and capable individuals at or near the top of the military 
hierarchy.  On the other hand, democracies tend to promote individuals to leadership positions 
based on a system of merits and achievement.  Rather than place individuals in these positions 
due to loyalty to the regime, democracies let those best suited to the task fill these positions 
based on their effectiveness as leaders (Reiter and Stam 1998b).    Bestowed with more talented 
military planners and leaders as well as having soldiers that possess greater initiative, democratic 
regimes have advantages that other regime types cannot necessarily claim (Reiter and Stam 
1998a, 1998b, 2002).   
2.4.4 Conflict Outcomes 
So what are the general findings on war outcomes based on regime type?  It appears that 
democratic regimes are careful about what wars they choose to fight.  That is, they generally 
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fight short wars with low numbers of casualties (Bennett and Stam 1996, 1998); Siverson 1995).  
Democracies also tend to win wars both when they initiate the conflict as well as when they are 
the initial target (Clark and Reed 2003; Reiter and Stam 1998a, 2002).  However, this advantage 
declines across time particularly when protracted conflict leads to high levels of casualties 
(Bennett and Stam 1998; Reiter and Stam 2002).  In sum, what should we expect from 
democracies prior to and during conflicts?  Essentially the evidence points toward a trend of 
democracies to carefully choose which conflicts they engage in (assuming they are the initiator) 
and that when they do commit to armed conflict there a wide variety of reasons that they would 
succeed in their efforts.  In fact, most evidence suggests that democracies are successful in war 
approximately 80% of the time (Reiter and Stam 2002).  This success rate is much higher than 
that of non-democratic regimes.  Why then do democratic regimes fair no better than their 
nondemocratic counterparts when conducting civil war interventions
1
?  By all accounts 
democracies are far more capable in combat than are non-democracies.  They also benefit from 
higher standards of leadership, better battle tactics, and better logistics.  They should also be 
more able to decide which interventions would be successful and avoid those that would be 
costly and most likely to fail.   
Previous research into intervention initiation and success has been largely limited to an 
examination of the internal characteristics of the state experiencing a civil war.  It is important to 
include both an analysis of conflict characteristics as well as examine how an intervener’s regime 
type influences the intervention process.  I believe that both impact the intervention process.  
However, no attempt has been made to assess both sets of factors.  This research project is an 
attempt to fill this gap in the literature by examining how regime types and their particular 
political institutions influence the decision to intervene and why these interventions succeed or 
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fail.  To do so, several questions must be addressed.  First, are democracies more prone to 
intervening in conflicts that are difficult to resolve?   If so, do the domestic political institutions 
of democracy pressure policy makers to intervene in conflict in which successful intervention is 
unlikely?  Further, based on our understanding of democratic war fighting efficiency, I would 
expect democracies to be more effective interveners.  Is this in fact the case?   If not, why do 
democracies, which are successful while conducting interstate wars, fail to achieve a similar 
success rate when intervening in intrastate conflicts? 
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CHAPTER 3:  DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS AND CIVIL WAR INTERVENTION 
PROCESSES 
 
3.1 Introduction  
Much of the conflict literature referring to the effect of regime type has been limited to 
examinations of interstate war.  In contrast, literature on intrastate conflict rarely mentions how 
an intervener’s regime type influences the decision to intervene.  Likewise, scholars have 
neglected to thoroughly examine how regime type affects the likelihood of a state successfully 
intervening in a civil war.  The literatures on interstate conflict and regime type provide a 
foundation for addressing questions regarding the possibility that democracies and non-
democracies differ fundamentally in how they conduct foreign policy formulation.    Previous 
research into intervention initiation and success has been limited to an examination of the 
internal characteristics of the state engaged in civil war.  This focus fails to take into 
consideration the internal characteristics of potential interveners which are an important yet 
unexamined factor in the intervention process.   
Democracies and non-democracies often function quite differently at the domestic and 
international level.  However, with regard to intrastate war intervention, the current literature 
appears to set aside the possibility that the governments that adopt these disparate political 
systems might approach the intervention process differently.  Democracies should, and I believe 
do, approach intervention differently than non-democracies.  The consequence of this alternative 
understanding of democratic intervention leads me to two hypotheses.  Democracies will 
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intervene in civil wars more often than non-democracies.  According to my theory, domestic 
political institutions unique to democracies force democratic policy makers to intervene, often in 
conflicts that they (the policy makers) would often prefer to avoid.  Additionally, the same 
domestic institutions that pressure democratic policy makers to intervene in these conflicts will 
undermine the ability of policy makers to successfully intervene in intrastate conflict.  If we are 
to better understand why states decide to intervene and whether or not those interventions are 
successful, then it is important to move beyond a simple analysis of conflict characteristics and 
begin to examine how an intervener’s domestic political institutions and norms shape the 
initiation process as well as an intervener’s success rate.  This research project is an attempt to 
fill this gap in the literature by examining how democratic regimes and their particular political 
institutions influence the decision to intervene and why these interventions succeed or fail.  In 
the sections that follow, I will argue that democracies must, by virtue of their unique domestic 
political institutions, consider interventions under a different set of political considerations than 
their non-democratic counterparts.   
3.2 The Intervention Decision Process:  The Democratic Paradox 
Many different factors lead to a nation intervening in another’s internal conflict.  The 
process that policy makers go through when deciding on whether or not to become involved in 
internal conflicts has traditionally been viewed in a relatively straightforward manner. When 
considering foreign policy decision such as this, policy makers ask themselves a variety of 
questions.  First, does this conflict have the potential to directly impact the national security 
interests of the potential intervener?  If so, then we could assume that policy makers would be 
inclined to take some sort of action to mitigate the potential security threat.  An example of this 
is a conflict occurring in a neighboring state.  In this case, there is the potential for the conflict to 
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spill over the border.  Alternatively, depending on the degree of threat present, they could choose 
to engage in buck-passing behavior by waiting to see if another neighbor decides to intervene.  
There are a wide variety of potential threats (to security or national interests in general) that 
policy makers could consider when deciding to intervene or not.  Of course, there are other 
reasons that policy makers choose to intervene that are not related to security or interests.   
Another consideration that leaders take into account is the intensity of the conflict.  One 
potential characteristic of low level conflict is that it is not always readily observable to policy 
makers.  Therefore, if conflict is not observed (at least at some significant level), 
intervention/non-intervention cannot be considered a matter of choice.  Let us assume that most 
leaders of governments have enough resources at hand to at least recognize when conflict occurs.  
If policy makers do observe the conflict and it is characterized by relatively low levels of 
violence, then it is likely that they would defer to a non-interventionist policy (at least in the 
short term) in the hope that the situation will correct itself without the need to intervene.  
However, if there is intense fighting accompanied by high casualty rates in addition to 
widespread destruction then it is more likely that a third party will choose to intervene (Regan 
1998).  Regan identifies intense conflict accompanied by high casualty rates as being a sufficient 
condition for a state to intervene in a civil war.  However, he neglects to offer insight as to why 
policy makers, in particular democratic policy makers, will choose to intervene.  I intend to build 
upon his general observations by identifying the possible underlying mechanisms of domestic 
political processes that lead to democratic intervention being observed.  
Democratic and non-democratic policy makers will both consider the likelihood of 
success of an intervention.  At this point the question of what qualifies as success could be 
debated depending on what the potential goal of the intervention is.  I will save that question for 
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later consideration.  Whatever policy makers consider success to be, it should be assumed that 
they would prefer to enter into the conflict if a positive outcome could be expected.  However, 
democratic leaders are not afforded the opportunity to abstain from intervention as easily as 
autocratic leaders.  It should be assumed that the majority of any democratic population would be 
unwilling and/or unable to fully consider the array of variables that help determine which 
conflicts lend themselves to successful intervention. If these populations have no interest in the 
conflict then policy makers can make their own determination of likelihood of success and act 
accordingly.  However, if public interest in intervention manifests itself among a democratic 
population then that population will pressure leaders to intervene even when the chances of 
success are low.  Autocratic leaders simply do not encounter this type of public feedback nearly 
as often as democratic leaders.  Thus, we should observe democracies intervening in intrastate 
conflict more often than their non-democratic counterparts.   
Another factor in the intervention calculus is the expected cost of intervention.  This 
could include the material, human, and political costs related to undertaking an intervention. It is 
likely that the intervening state would likely wish to calculate the minimum level of resources 
that they must commit to ensure the likelihood (as best they can given the fluid nature of 
conflict) that the mission is successful.   While both democratic and non-democratic state 
governments should be able to calculate these costs with some degree of accuracy, most in any 
general population are unlikely to be able to do so.  For non-democracies this calculation should 
allow them to determine what is needed to succeed and allocate the requisite resources to help 
insure a successful intervention.  Democratic governments should also have the ability to 
estimate the cost of success.  Again, constraints on the ability to implement a successful policy 
are subject to the whims of a democratic population.  Whereas autocratic leaders incur these 
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costs without regard for public opinion related to the cost of success, democratic leaders are 
potentially subject to public scrutiny of the intervention costs.  If the costs of intervention are 
deemed too high by a democratic public, democratic leaders are constrained from employing the 
resources necessary to achieve success in intervention.   Thus, because of cost constraints placed 
on democratic leaders by their populations, we should observe democracies failing to achieve 
successful intervention outcomes.   
These expectations present us with a potentially vexing problem that democratic leaders 
face.  An unsophisticated democratic public can force leaders to undertake potentially high risk 
interventions while at the same time insisting that the cost incurred through the intervention be 
kept at a level that ensure a lower likelihood of success.  Democracies are different.  Democratic 
policy makers must approach the intervention process in a manner that is distinct from their no-
democratic counterparts. This democratic paradox is the overarching phenomena that I seek to 
explain.  In the following sections I will explain how democratic institutions shape intervention 
policy.  Democratic leaders have a unique political relationship with their respective populations 
relative to their non-democratic counterparts.  Public opinion matters to democratic leaders. Due 
to the nature of the political system within which these democratic leaders operate, they must 
take active public opinion into consideration when making political choices, intervention policy 
being one example.  Furthermore, the freedoms and access afforded to media organizations in 
democracies serves to enhance the ability of populations to communicate preferences to the 
political leadership.  The synergism of public opinion and media can have a measurable effect on 
democratic policy maker’s decisions to intervene in civil war.  The coupling of active public 
opinion and a free press with post-materialistic attitudes, expressed most profoundly in 
democratic states, further shapes the policy preferences of democratic leaders.  These factors, 
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when considered together, lead me to believe that democratic leaders can be forced to engage in 
risky interventions more often and less successfully.   
3.3 Democracies, Public Opinion and Civil War Intervention  
In an autocratic state, a more simplistic cost benefit analysis reflects the intervention 
process accurately.  Policy makers in autocratic states tend to be more insulated from potential 
pressure from their populations than their democratic counterparts.  This is not to say that there is 
no relevant audience that policy makers must appeal to in order to move forward with a decision. 
Rather the potential pool of audiences is much smaller and often more closely linked 
ideologically with those at the highest level of government.  Therefore fewer constraints are 
placed upon autocratic policy makers when considering the decision to intervene.  Conversely, in 
democratic states domestic political considerations both constrain and advocate particular foreign 
policy preferences.  Much of the literature on decision-making indicates that a fundamental 
feature of the political context regarding policy decisions is a concern over the acceptability of 
that decision (Art 1973, Farnem 1990).  That is to say that if policy is expected to be effective it 
must be acceptable to relevant groups and individuals.  Who then are these “relevant” groups?  
In an autocracy this is often limited to a relatively small group of individuals that have influence 
over governmental policy.  Democracies, by way of the manner in which institutions are more 
closely tied to the desires of those they govern, have potentially many more relevant groups.   
Whether or not there is a considerable amount of policy shift observed under conditions 
of shifting public opinion has been debated through much of the literature.  There are those who 
assert that policy preferences will adapt to changing public opinion regarding those policies.  
One theory is that policies should be expected to respond to public opinion given that under 
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certain circumstances elected officials will be responsive to public opinion in anticipation of 
either positive or negative public response to proposed policies (Downs 1957; Davis, Hinich, and 
Ordeshook 1970).  They argue that electoral viability of policy makers is contingent on the 
approval of certain electoral majorities.  Under conditions of perfect information this relationship 
appears logical.   One of the more frequent disagreements among scholars studying policy 
responsiveness is what the causal relationship between public opinion and public policy is.  
Those that would argue that policy makers are responsive to changing public opinion see policy 
being shaped by the policy opinions of engaged publics.   
Conversely, there are those that will argue that this causal relationship works in reverse.  
That is, rather than public opinion affecting policy responsiveness, public opinion leaders will 
seek to shape public opinion in a manner that favors those policy makers’ preferences.  This 
could come in a variety of forms.  Either policy makers will seek to inform an uneducated public 
about how a particular policy or policy outcome would be beneficial to the public (Mill 1962; 
Key 1961), or policy makers could choose to actively mislead the public as to the nature of the 
policy or the potential consequences of that policy (Edelman 1964; Wise 1973; Miliband 1976). 
While there is certainly merit in all of these arguments, it is my contention that policy is 
in fact responsive (to a certain degree) to public opinion.  The assertion that policy makers would 
seek to educate an uninformed public first assumes that publics are largely ignorant to events.  
While this is true in the short term, I would argue that any event of significant magnitude (e.g. a 
major civil war) would appear on much of the public’s political radar at some point.  
Additionally, while democratic publics would not necessarily have any specific reaction to an 
unfamiliar event, they hold opinions about similar events and policy prescriptions that have 
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occurred in the past.  Therefore, they often have latent opinions that simply have not had an 
opportunity to be expressed.   
I am even more skeptical of the argument that policy makers could be engaged in 
deliberate deception in order to shape public opinion.  While it is certainly possible, the 
conditions under which this approach would be successful would need to be very specific.  First, 
the public would need to be almost wholly unaware of an event and the policy proposal directed 
at it.  In this case the need to deceive the public would be unnecessary as policy makers could 
simply go private with their policy choice and the relevant publics would be none the wiser.  In 
order for this condition of public ignorance to exist it would require an inattentive public and 
either an ineffective press corps, or a press corps that is complicit in and supportive of the 
deception.  In the case of an autocratic nation, these conditions are possible.  However, in 
democratic states I argue that it is unlikely that going private or actively seeking to obscure the 
policy would be possible for any significant amount of time.   
Fortunately, there has been some limited research related to this causal relationship.  A. 
D. Monroe’s (1978) examination of policy and public opinion congruence indicates that there 
measurable consistency between the two.  This observation is most profound when considering 
foreign policy and what he terms “highly salient” issues.  However, this does not suggest a 
solution to the questions surrounding the causal relationship.  Again, a narrow vein of research 
provides us with clues as to whether or not opinion drives policy or whether the reverse is the 
case.  Not only can we observe policy and opinion congruency but it also appears that public 
opinion drives this process.  If shifts in public opinion on a salient issue are significant and can 
be sustained over an extended period of time policy will tend to conform to this public opinion 
(Page and Shapiro 1983).  Furthermore, Page and Shapiro have observed this opinion movement 
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preceding changes in public policy leading me to believe that public opinion can and does affect 
policy decisions.  It is my hope that this dissertation will provide further evidence of this causal 
relationship being driven in large part by public opinion. 
If there is a general lack of knowledge among the public about the existence of a 
particular foreign policy issue, then the policy maker necessarily has greater freedom to 
implement policy that he or she believes is best suited to the situation.  In other words, the 
leadership is not constrained by public opinion.  There are limited (if any) negative consequences 
to implementing the policy due to lack of awareness on the part of the public.  Holding private 
information about policy is, in many cases, preferred by leaders.  Democratic leaders in 
particular wish to hold private information to avoid public scrutiny of the policy which would 
trigger a negative response by public.  A negative view of the policy might translate into political 
blowback that policy makers rightly wish to avoid.  However, this does not means that latent 
public policy will not necessarily be dismissed by policy makers.  Policy makers do not consider 
unexpressed public opinion unimportant.  These policy makers understand that there is a 
possibility that dormant public opinion can be activated even if they (the policy makers) are not 
the ones to initiate this activation.  A robust media infrastructure is a likely activator of public 
policy outside of the policy making establishment.    
Because they recognize that activation is possible, policy makers will attempt to predict 
public reaction to a policy in the eventuality that the policy is publicized.  Furthermore, they will 
attempt to assess how this predicted public opinion could impact the implementation of policy 
makers’ preferred foreign policy proposals (Powlick 1991; Hinckley 1992).  Therefore, even 
when a preferred foreign policy has been determined, the activation of public opinion and the 
potential resistance to a particular policy will induce policy makers to tailor the policy in such a 
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way that it falls within a perceived range of acceptability by the public.  This pre-activation 
calculation has the potential to shape policy prior to the public being significantly aware of the 
event or policies related to it 
  Policy makers could, if they choose to, broadcast the policy thereby activating public 
opinion.  However, given limited public knowledge in this case, doing so would unnecessarily 
expose the policy to public scrutiny and potentially lead to disapproval of the policy (Baum 
2004).  There is some evidence that U.S. Presidents tend to “go private” with policies that do not 
have a direct impact on national security (Smith 1998; Schultz 2001).  While there may be a 
political incentive in going public with a policy announcement (obtaining a positive audience 
benefit from successful policy), it also allows an opportunity for negative public attitudes toward 
the policy to be expressed.   
3.4 Media’s Effect on Public Opinion and Foreign Policy  
Announcing policy preferences and action is not a role limited to policy makers.  Given 
the limited nature of the conflict I would assume that inaction would be the likely policy choice 
in this case.  Assuming a professional and effective press corps, we could expect that at least 
some coverage of the policy would be presented to the public.  However, limited conflicts would 
likely lead to limited coverage.  So, even if the potential policy preference of the public is in 
favor of active government intervention, public opinion is not activated and the preference is not 
expressed to policy makers.  In this scenario, the conflict occurs, policy is made, and the public 
has little opportunity to react (Katz and Powlick 1996). 
In another scenario, there is a civil war and the level of conflict is intense.  There is a 
growing humanitarian crisis and the violence is escalating.  Again, the conflict has little or no 
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impact on the national security position of the potential intervener.  However, in this instance I 
assume that media coverage of the event will be significantly more pronounced.  One might 
questions why media outlets would choose to cover this type of event.  Graber (1997) proposes 
that media outlets will choose to cover stories according to five criteria.  First, does it directly 
impact the lives of potential viewers?  Given the particulars of this case it is unlikely to do so.  
Second, does the story have elements of violence, conflict, disaster, or possibly scandal?  
Certainly a civil war of the type described fits within this criterion.  Third, is it familiar?  This is 
often difficult to determine.  However, since this is one of the primary considerations for 
deciding what to cover, I would assume that it probably has not been reported extensively and 
therefore would be unfamiliar to the public.  Fourth, audience proximity is considered.  In the 
American context, the audience proximity would probably be distant given the geographical 
location of the United States.  This obviously depends on how one measures proximity 
(regionally, continentally, ideologically, etc).  Finally, is the event timely or novel?  This too 
would vary, but I assume that a current civil war would be at the very least considered timely. 
Civil wars meet at least one of the criteria Graber describes, violence and conflict.  More 
importantly, this is one of the most important of the five when outlets choose to report events.  In 
this case then, I would assume that coverage of the event would be significant.  Let us further 
assume that the leaders of the potential intervener would again choose to refrain from 
intervening.  Not only is the event not vital to the national security interests of the state, but the 
material cost to intervene successfully would most probably be much greater than in the minor 
conflict previously mentioned.  I believe that the key difference between the two scenarios is the 
level of media coverage given to both events.  In this case it is much less likely that the policy 
makers would be able to keep the policy private.   
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Rather, media coverage of the event would necessarily expose the policy to public 
scrutiny and thus potential audience costs.  It does so through the following steps according to 
Powlick and Katz (1998).  A policy decision is made.  The public has several options: ignore the 
policy, accept it, mildly resist the policy, or voice strong opposition to the policy.  The authors 
assume that the policy is presented.  I would argue that this does not always happen.  From that 
point the media decides whether or not to cover the event.  If they choose not to cover the event 
then, as indicated earlier, there is no opportunity for public opinion to activate.   
However, even with a widespread and active press corps reporting on events, there has 
been a vast array of empirical analysis that seems to suggest that domestic audiences have little 
inclination to seek out and attempt to gain a greater understanding of their nation’s foreign policy 
(Almond 1950; Rosenau 1961; Newman, Just, and Crigler 1992; Ericson, MacKuen, and 
Stimson 1994).  The conclusion of much of this work appears to indict domestic audiences as 
being apathetic to issues and policies that exist beyond their limited, primarily domestic views of 
and interest in politics.  These assertions should not be altogether unsurprising.  The day to day 
activities of most individuals are more often than not unaffected directly by events beyond their 
nation’s borders.  Given the stresses of daily life such as work, family and other potential 
distractions, we could conceive of the individuals as being rationally ignorant of affairs that have 
little or no material consequence to them.   
Generally speaking, the American public was long considered to be considered quite 
disengaged from as well as uninformed about foreign policy issues (Converse and Markus 1979; 
Zaller 1992).  That is, most of the time domestic audiences will have unstable opinion regarding 
foreign affairs, if they are aware of them at all. This indicates a lack of political sophistication on 
the part of the public.  However, lack of political sophistication is not necessarily an indication of 
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a lack of opinion relative to a particular policy.  Individuals have a tendency to respond to 
questions posed to them whether or not they have any relevant knowledge about the subject in 
question.  They have opinions that they can express in a more or less truthful manner even 
though the subject matter is quite foreign to them (Mueller 1973; Zaller 1992.  The end result of 
this general ignorance to public policy, and foreign policy in particular, is that public opinion 
related to these policies tends to lie dormant.  Public opinion will continue to exist in this 
dormant state until the emergence of an event or proposal that results in an activation of latent 
public opinion (Key 1964; Powlick and Katz 1998).  
This is particularly true of domestic populations in well established democracies.  As 
noted earlier, these states tend to be geographically clustered and often well removed from areas 
experiencing conflict.  As such, we should expect that policy regarding distant events and 
peoples would unduly distract much of a domestic population from domestic concerns closer to 
home.  This is especially true considering the time and energy required to contemplate the policy 
implications of states interacting with each other on the global stage.  
Most unsophisticated publics will tend to skew their attention away from hard news 
outlets toward more entertainment oriented programming (Chaffee and Kanihan 1997).  Their 
desire to meaningfully dissect the intricacies of policy, specifically foreign policy, is much lower 
than that of what we might consider attentive or sophisticated publics.  Furthermore, these 
unsophisticated publics, who are often considered apathetic toward policy matters, often feel as 
if they have no meaningful way of influencing policy even if they desired to do so (Key 1961; 
Rosenau 1961; Cohen 1973).  Despite this apparent apathy and the tendency of unsophisticated 
publics to direct their attention away from sources of “hard” news, it is increasingly the case that 
policy information is being disseminated through non-traditional channels.   
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More specifically, so called “soft” news sources have to a much greater degree than in the 
past devoted time and resources to covering foreign affairs.  Soft news sources are generally 
differentiated from hard news sources by two variables.  Typically, subjects such as politics, 
economics are considered to be “hard news.”  The focus of the coverage tends to be factual in 
nature.  Sources reporting hard news are interested in covering the specifics of the events being 
covered.  “Soft news” sources on the other hand have traditionally sought to shy away from 
topics that are typically the perview of hard news sources.  Rather, these outlets seek to inform or 
advise audiences about topics of general human interest or simply entertain them.  While 
probably not to the same degree as traditional news sources, these outlets do provide a general 
overview of international events.  This is particularly true of dramatic events unfolding in distant 
countries, specifically conflict in which a human drama is a significant component.   It seems as 
though many of these soft news outlets have seized upon the realization that while they can 
satisfy their audiences with compelling tales of dramatic human interest stories of domestic 
origin, the same desire on the part of their audiences to be informed of disaster and human drama 
at home translates into an interest in drama unfolding in the rest of the world.  These same 
unsophisticated publics, who intentionally eschewed the perhaps antiseptic policy analysis of an 
event provided by mainstream media outlets, find themselves engrossed by world events quite 
regardless of whether they intended to do so.  Therefore even individuals who shy away from 
discussion of policy, domestic or foreign, have the opportunity to be exposed to debate that has 
the potential to activate dormant public opinion in those who would otherwise not engage in 
contemplation of policy. 
Once media coverage (via traditional or soft media) is provided, an opportunity for elite 
debate of the policy exists.  If the public has access to this content of this debate then it can begin 
45 
 
to form an opinion with regard to the stated policy of the government.  The public could approve 
of the policy and no costs would be incurred.  However, the mere fact that public awareness 
could be higher leaves open the possibility that there would be portions of the population that 
would disagree with stated policy of the government and lobby for a change in position.   This is 
not to say they the public becomes more sophisticated in their understanding of the issue, only 
more aware of it.  As the level of media coverage increases then the likelihood of a relevant 
group in opposition to the non-interventionist policy could emerge as well.  Policy makers could 
be perfectly happy with the policy as is.  They may feel that non-intervention is the best 
approach. After all, interventions have at least some minimum costs associated with them.  In the 
low level conflict the only cost would be that of material and manpower to conduct the 
intervention.  In the high level conflict, with the addition media coverage which serves as the 
first step in activating public opinion, political cost are now present.  If the relevant public in 
opposition to the policy is significant enough, then the non-interventionist policy could lead to 
negative public perceptions of policy makers who fail to recognize and react to activated public 
opinion.     
This presents a problem for policy makers, particularly if they are elected officials.  They 
could continue with the current policy and risk losing significant political support from certain 
segments of the population.  This could be problematic if the event occurs during an election 
period or if it fails to terminate before the next election cycle.  Still the official(s) could believe 
that the current policy is optimal.  Thus, the policy maker has encountered a conflict between 
domestic and foreign policy and must determine some acceptable alternative to current policy 
(Farnham 1990).  Ideally, he or she would like to know whether or not the opposition audience 
costs do not outweigh the cost of intervening.  However, this can be quite difficult.  The question 
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then becomes one of how the policy maker can seek an alternative policy that will work best on 
both dimensions.   Policy makers will attempt to forge a compromise position that attempts to 
satisfy both the need to address the foreign policy issue as well as domestic policy preferences 
(Mintz 1993).  Additionally, the policy maker will not only consider both dimensions of the 
policy, but will actually consider domestic politics first when reformulating the policy. 
3.5  Post Materialistic Attitudes and the Push Toward Intervention 
 While media coverage of an event, for my purposes a civil war, is a necessary condition 
for the activation of latent public opinion, it is not however sufficient for activating public action.  
Simply being aware of an event does not lead individuals to actively take part in the policy 
making process.  Rather, proactive populations must be both aware of an event and believe that 
the event is relevant enough to their lives in order for that population to proactively engage in the 
policy discussion.  This is the second condition that I believe differentiates democratic publics 
from those in non-democratic states.  In this section I will examine the role of post-materialistic 
attitudes in democratic populations and the mechanism by which these attitudes lead these 
populations to action.   
Maslow (1943) asserts that humans will tend to satisfy particular needs according to a 
specified hierarchy.  At the bottom of the hierarchy we find biological and physiological.  These 
include the most basic needs required for humans to survive.  When these needs are not being 
met it is basic human nature that individuals will seek to attain these fundamental requirements 
prior to engaging in any other activity.  Once these have been obtained individuals will focus on 
safety needs.  These include protection of oneself and assurance of a stable and secure 
environment.  This includes not only physical stability, but economic stability as well.  This 
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economic stability component will be the starting point of my argument regarding post-
materialistic attitudes and public opinion regarding foreign policy attitude.  Beyond these safety 
needs, humans begin to form meaningful relationships.  I will argue that these relationships do 
not necessarily have to be restricted to those in close relational or geographic proximity to one 
another.   
Finally, we come to the esteem needs.  Once basic physiological, safety, and relational 
needs are met, individuals will pursue more personal and material goals.  These could include 
achievement of a particular status, the acquisition of wealth, and an enhanced desire to be 
responsible for making decisions not only for oneself but for others within the individual’s 
sphere of influence.  Once these “deficiency needs” (Maslow 1943) have been met, individuals 
can allow themselves to focus less on the what the individual must have to survive and thrive and 
more on the potential of the individual to more significantly affect events previously thought to 
be out of one’s control.   
In general, the more able one is to assure himself of the basic requirements of survival 
and security the more likely he is to concern himself with matters less related to basic survival.  
This concept is expressed in Inglehart’s (1977) scarcity hypothesis.  In it, Inglehart suggests that 
all individuals can appreciate and seek to attain freedom and autonomy.  However, under 
conditions where the most basic needs (food, shelter, physical security, etc) of the individuals are 
not being met, they will prioritize their personal goals to ensure that the most fundamental needs 
for human survival are being met.  Under these conditions materialistic attitudes will prevail.  
Conversely, under conditions of conditions of physical and economic security, individuals will 
begin to exhibit post-materialistic attitudes by pursuing goals such as knowledge acquisition, self 
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awareness, and a need to understand the meaning of external events and how those events and 
their consequences affect the individuals understanding of the world around them.   
Until the period following World War II, much of the world’s population had existed in a 
state where materialistic values prevailed.  Instability existed at both the international and 
national level across much of the globe.  Frequent interstate war along with unstable economic 
conditions in many countries perpetuated these materialistic attitudes.  However, in the decades 
following World War II there has been a marked shift in the attitudes of individuals.  This is 
particularly true of advanced industrial societies (Inglehart 2008).  The post war era ushered in 
economic stability and prosperity in many of these societies and there is significant evidence that 
younger cohorts in these societies exhibit greater and increasing levels of post-materialistic 
attitudes (Inglehart 1971, 1977, 2008).  That is individuals in the post-war era were less likely to 
experience deficiencies in physical and economic requirements outlined by Maslow.   
 It is this shift in attitudes from materialism to post-materialism that I am most interested 
in as it relates to civil war intervention processes.  I propose that societies with a larger 
proportion of individuals exhibiting post-materialistic attitudes will engage in and wish to 
influence discussions of policy once latent public opinion has been engaged.  Post-materialistic 
attitudes are an important factor to consider when determining whether or not a state will choose 
to intervene in a civil war.  In an advanced industrial society, post-materialistic attitudes are 
likely prevalent among many individuals that live in that country.  Certainly there will be those 
who still have to face the prospect of not having their basic needs being met.  Overall however, 
economic, relational, and security needs are attainable by much of the population.   
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This stands in stark contrast to the plight of the much of the populations of states in the 
underdeveloped world.  Populations in these states are faced with a variety of impediments to 
assuring themselves of a stable and secure daily existence.  Potable drinking water is often in 
short supply even in the more developed regions of the second and third world.  Communicable 
diseases are not uncommon.  The economic systems in many of these states are unstable.  Given 
these conditions it would be difficult to expect post-materialistic attitudes to develop among 
much of the second and third world’s population.  The majority will be too preoccupied with 
satisfying the conditions that allow for their survival.  Therefore, we should expect varying levels 
of post-materialistic attitudes based in part on the stability of the state that an individual finds 
himself.  Fortunately, existing research confirms this expectation.  Most advanced industrial 
societies do exhibit higher levels of post-materialistic attitudes.  The graphic below illustrates 
this to be the case. 
Figure 3.1 Materialist/Post-Materialist Values by GNP/CAPITA
 
Figure referenced from Ronald F. Inglehart (2008): Changing Values among Western Publics 
from 1970 to 2006, West European Politics, 31:1-2, 130-146 
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Not only does Inglehart’s (2008) graphic indicate that states with greater economic 
stability and mobility tend to produce populations that hold post-materialistic values it also 
reveals information directly related to my argument.  I have asserted that democracies and 
autocracies are in many cases fundamentally different.  One of these conditions is that 
democratic populations are more likely to exhibit post-materialistic attitudes.  This chart 
illustrates that to a large degree.  When considering post materialism we can see that many of the 
populations exhibiting this trait tend to be in established industrial democracies.  These are 
clustered in the upper right hand corner of the graphic.  Furthermore, once a population adopts 
post-materialistic attitudes, subsequent generations tend to adopt this attitude as well increasing 
the proportion of the population that holds these views.  Although this trend can be interrupted 
for short periods based on economic conditions in a state, this temporary lapse in attitudes does 
not appear to be long term or regressive.  The prevalence of post-materialism among the 
populations of these states is critical to my argument.  I propose that individuals with post 
materialistic attitudes will be more likely to pressure democratic policy makers to intervene in 
civil wars.  Unlike individuals living under conditions which would suppress post-materialistic 
attitudes, citizens living in established democracies are often afforded the opportunity to consider 
the circumstances of individuals experiencing a civil war.  With their material and security needs 
being met they have the capacity to actively contemplate the policy implications of their state 
intervening in a conflict. 
 Individuals exhibiting post-materialistic attitudes can examine the circumstances of those 
experiencing a civil war and have the potential to form an ideational relationship with those 
individuals.  There may not be a physical or familial relationship between him and the individual 
experiencing the conflict.  However, there could exist an ideational link between the two.  The 
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school teacher in Kansas will recognize that a civil war in a far removed state may not directly 
impact his daily life.  However, he may construct an intersubjective relationship with another 
individual based on his ideological norms (Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink 2001).  For example, 
our teacher (given the fact that he lives in the United States) probably adheres to a number of 
ideological norms such as equal treatment under the law or the right to life except under 
circumstances in which the law provides that this protection has been forfeited by the individual.    
According to democratic legalism theory, regime type is critical in understanding how 
respect for the rule of law governs the affairs of states.  Democratic states adhere to norms of 
judicial processes, limitations placed on government action, and constitutional constraints.  Not 
only do they observe these norms domestically, they often apply them to international relations 
as well (Simmons 1999).  Similarly, when democratic states engage in dispute resolution they are 
more likely to seek peaceful methods in resolving their conflict.  In short they will prefer 
political compromise and eschew violent conflict as a means of resolving their differences 
(Dixon 1993, 1994, 1996).  Democracies are also more likely to accept third party involvement 
in the conflict resolution process.  Dixon (1993) and Raymond (1994) find that democracies are 
both more likely to accept third party engagement and that this dramatically increases the 
likelihood that conflicts will be resolved peacefully.  While these findings focus on democratic 
norms at the state level, individuals within democratic state internalize these norms, project these 
norms on others, and use their understanding of these norms to analyze external events.   
 When a citizens in democratic states become aware that other individuals are being 
denied these rights, as is often the case in intrastate conflict, they projects these norms upon that 
person creating an ideological relationship within their minds.  After establishing this link, the 
post-materialist/legalist  not only has an opportunity to influence policies that may impact the 
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other individual but may feel compelled to do so given his desire to affect the plight of the 
individual(s) in the conflict area.  I believe this to be particularly true when the circumstances of 
the civil war and the civil war victim are most dire.  That is, the more egregious the 
characteristics of the civil war, the more compelled the post-materialist/legalist will be to affect 
the event.  In this particular case, that would entail pressuring policy makers to intervene in order 
to alleviate the suffering of individuals and populations in the afflicted country.  Conversely, 
while there are almost certainly varying levels of post-materialistic thought among more affluent 
populations in autocratic states, the absence of understanding of or adherence to democratic 
norms and legalist thought will preclude these populations from developing any strong ideational 
relationships with the individuals excluded from protection according to democratic norms.   
 It is the existence of post-materialistic/legalist attitudes in conjunction with the presence 
of a free press that I believe forces democratic policy makers to undertake the decision to 
intervene in a manner divergent to autocratic policy makers.  For me to make a positive link 
between a free press and post-materialism leading to unique policy making decision in 
democracies it is necessary to show that there is a correlation between the two conditions.  The 
following graphic provides a cursory link between the two.   
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Figure 3.2 World Press Freedom Index 2012
 
Figure referenced from en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2011-2012,1043.html 
Again, much like the data on post-materialism we can see that the existence of a free press is 
largely concentrated among modern industrialized democracies.  These states tend to cluster in 
Western Europe and North America.   
3.6 Conclusion and Hypotheses Related to Intervention Initiation 
According to my theory, democratic policy makers must contend with domestic political 
pressure when considering civil war interventions.  This domestic political pressure should not 
be nearly as relevant to autocratic policy makers given the lack of free press and the low levels of 
post-materialistic attitudes.  When both post-materialist attitudes and a free press exist within a 
state, as they do in many established democracies I should be able to observe a variance in the 
intervention decision calculus between democracies and non-democracies.   
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Because a free press exists in most of these states domestic populations are exposed to 
the existence of events beyond their own limited personal experiences.  Autocratic states tend to 
have a press corps that is less interested in providing unbiased information to the population.  
Rather, these organizations act more like an entity of the state that disseminates information at 
the behest of the regime in order to suppress information or only provide news coverage of 
events that tend to benefit the regime.  Alternatively, media resources in democratic states tend 
to provide a much wider range of information to the public.  This may or may not be beneficial 
to policy makers who might prefer to make policy out of the general public’s view.  Thus, a free 
press has a greater ability to activate public opinion in a manner that undercuts democratic policy 
makers’ ability to make policy based on strict cost benefit calculations.  This is true even when 
publics are generally unsophisticated.  News will filter through the media infrastructure, even 
through those outlets that are not necessarily designed to convey policy information.  This is 
particularly true of events in which extreme crises and violence are presented to the public for 
consumption.    
When democratic, and likely post-materialistic, publics become aware of a crises they 
have to decide whether or not to actively engage in the policy making process.  In the case of a 
minor conflict where there are few visible casualties, they will likely be satisfied to let the 
internal parties to the conflict resolve the situation.  However, when a conflict is characterized by 
a high casualty count, extended duration, and/or mass movements of refugees, democratic 
publics will be more likely to pressure policy makers to intervene.  Furthermore, when more than 
one of these characteristics exists, I expect even more pressure to intervene being brought to bear 
on democratic leaders.  Because of the pressure from democratic populations for their policy 
makers to act when a civil war occurs, I propose the following hypotheses 
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H1:   Democratic policy makers will be observed to intervene in intense civil wars more 
often than their non-democratic counterparts.  
H2: Because of their propensity to intervene in difficult to resolve civil wars, 
democracies will be less successful  
Democratic policy makers operate under particular constraints that limit their ability to 
effectively choose which civil wars they wish to intervene in.  In the following chapter I intend 
to address the proposition that democratic states engage in intervention more often than non-
democracies.  My expectation is that I will find democratic states intervening in civil wars at a 
higher rate than non-democracies.  Furthermore, I expect that, due to post-materialistic attitudes 
among democratic populations, democratic states will tend to engage in high risk interventions.  
Once engaged in a high risk intervention however, domestic sentiment impedes democracies 
from successfully concluding these interventions.  
 Of course there are alternative conclusions that could be drawn from the existing 
literature.  Based on evidence related to interstate conflict, we may surmise that democracies are 
in fact better at avoiding high risk conflict than their non-democratic counterparts.  Thus, by 
being potentially more able to identify high risk conflicts, we might observe democracies 
engaging in low or very low risk interventions and successfully concluding them.  While these 
conclusions run counter to my theoretical argument I feel it important to mention them.  If in fact 
the empirical evidence does not appear to support my hypotheses, we will have gained some, I 
believe, valuable knowledge regarding the effect of regime type on foreign policy decisions.  
Specifically, it lends us insight into the previously unasked question as to whether or not regime 
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type makes a difference when considering civil war intervention.   The following chapter will 
attempt to determine which of these conclusions, if any, stand up to empirical analysis. 
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CHAPTER 4:  DEMOCRATIC INTERVENTION ONSET 
4.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter I will test the hypotheses that have been established based on the 
theoretical arguments presented in chapter 3.  In the following section I will propose a research 
design to test my hypothesis that democratic states are more likely to engage in high risk 
interventions and because of this are less often successful when they intervene.  In the following 
chapter I seek to accomplish three goals.  The first will be to describe the data used in the 
analysis.  Secondly, I will discuss the measures used to test my hypotheses.  Finally, I will 
interpret the results as they pertain to my hypotheses. 
4.2 Research Design 
4.2.1 Data and Dependent Variables 
In order to assess the impact that regime type has on the propensity of a state to intervene 
in high risk civil wars and whether or not those interveners are successful, I have constructed a 
dataset that includes data on interventions, the intensity of civil wars, and the success of those 
interventions.  Fortunately, a data set compiled by Jacob Kathman (2011) contains much of the 
appropriate data that would need to be used for my analysis.  One of the strengths of this dataset 
is comprehensiveness of the dates of armed conflict ranging from 1950 through 1999 thus 
providing a broad range of conflicts to analyze.  Regan (1996) defines civil war as “armed 
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combat between two groups within state boundaries in which there are at least 200 fatalities.”  
The dataset identifies (need to count) civil wars between 1950 and 1999 with 535 annual 
observations of interventions being recorded during that period.  The types of interventions 
included in the analysis are military and economic. While using the actual number of 
interventions as a unit of analysis is possible, doing so could be problematic.  By not taking into 
account the actual number of potential interveners in every conflict a certain amount of selection 
bias is introduced into the model. Kathman (2011) has remedied this problem by expanding the 
existing data from Lemke and Regan’s work.  Previously, the only factor that was considered 
whether or not a state intervened in a particular civil war.  In Kathman’s data, each civil war is 
treated as an annual intervention opportunity for each state in the system less the state 
experiencing the civil war.  The result of this expanded data set presents us with 182,137 cases of 
intervention opportunity.   
4.2.2  Model 
 As previously stated, I believe that the regime type of any potential interveners has an 
impact on intervention processes.  Specifically, democracies, for reasons specified in chapter 
3, will intervene more often than their non-democratic counterparts in more intractable 
conflicts and because of this they are less likely to be successful.  At the very least they will 
not be successful to the degree that we observe when they engage interstate conflict.  
Initially, using a logit or probit analysis of my dependant variables appeared to be methods 
suitable for testing my dependant variables.  This however presents a problem in that doing 
so could necessarily introduce a significant level of selection bias into the models.  Following 
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Lemke and Regan’s logic, observing major powers experiencing success simply by examining 
which conflicts they intervened in, we may very well be observing states selecting into 
interventions that they are relatively sure will be successful.  Therefore, not only does being 
a any given factor directly affect the outcome of the intervention, there is also an indirect 
impact on the decision to intervene in the first place.  Like Lemke and Regan’s (2004) 
analysis I have two binary dependant variables: intervention and success.  Intervention 
indicates whether or not a potential intervener chose to intervene in a conflict.  The second 
being whether or not they were subsequently successful according to the aforementioned 
criteria.  Logically it follows then that a state must choose to intervene in order for success to 
be an option and thus coded 1.  Because of the potential for bias when testing for both 
dependant variables independently, the most appropriate way to test my hypotheses is by 
employing a censored probit model.  By simultaneously estimating coefficients for both sets 
of control variables in this manner, direct effects on the independent variables are measured 
while controlling for indirect effects.  Lemke and Regan (2004) term this “selecting into an 
opportunity.” 
4.2.3 Measures of Intensity 
My hypotheses state that democracies will intervene more often in high intensity conflicts 
and that intervention in risky and costly conflicts inevitably leads to lower rates of successful 
intervention.  Because of this, I need to not only identify intervention, but will also need to 
differentiate between high and low cost interventions.  The data does provide variables related to 
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conflict intensity.  Two methods of defining the intensity of any conflict will be employed in the 
analysis.  First, a fatality dummy variable will be used to define the data for analysis.  In any 
conflict in which the conflict fatality level exceeds the mean of 83,000 the fatality dummy will 
be coded as 1 and zero otherwise.  I expect that higher numbers of battle deaths will indicate a 
lower level of tractability in conflict.  Given this lowered ability to effectively manage a 
conflict I would expect intervention to be less likely according to accepted understandings of 
civil war intervention.  As indicated in chapter 2 , low cost wars/intervention are those in 
which the duration is expected to be short, the costs low, and the expectation of success high.  
In contrast, certain conflict characteristics lend themselves to high risk intervention.  High 
total casualty counts and high yearly casualty counts (intensity) are both characteristics that 
appear to predict higher cost/higher risk interventions.  My theory proposes that 
democracies are more likely to intervene in conflicts which appear more intractable based on 
conflict intensity.  Furthermore, conflicts of great intensity tend to be more difficult to 
successfully intervene in. 
Alternatively, another measure for intensity might also be useful.  Also included in 
the data set is a variable termed refugee.  According to Regan’s (2000) definition, a 
humanitarian crisis is triggered once 50,000 refugees have fled the conflict zone.  Given my 
theoretical argument, this measure of conflict intensity fits well and will be used as an 
alternative to the fataldum in my analysis.  Again, I will modify the data set in order to run 
models with and without the refugee dummy.  As with the fatality dummy, I expect 
increased instances of democratic intervention when a refugee crisis exists. Using both of 
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these measures of intensity will allow me to identify cases in the data appropriately in order to 
analyze only those conflicts which I have designated as intense or not intense according to these 
criteria.  My expectation is that we will observe democracies intervening in these hard cases 
more often than their non democratic counterparts.   
4.2.4 Intervention Success   
Successful interventions could be defined in multiple ways.  Rather than assuming 
that all interveners seek to simply end the conflict in order for a political settlement to have 
the potential to take root, each intervener will have its own interests at stake on some level 
and states will carefully chose which side to assist to achieve their desired political outcome.  
Seeking to ensure some level of regional stability, ideology, protection of the intervener’s 
economic, military, or diplomatic goals, as well as preventing or containing humanitarian 
crises have all been posited as legitimate goals of intervention (Pearson 1974; Cooper and 
Berdal 1993).  No matter what the particular goal, states may choose to intervene by assessing 
the conflict in terms of their own interests and choose sides according to whichever they 
calculate to have the highest probability of  furthering the interveners interests whatever 
they may be.  Regan’s (1996) data includes a measure of success for any given intervention.  
Success in Regan’s analysis is defined as the cessation of the conflict for 6 months at a 
minimum.  Of course there are other measures of success.  Licklider (1993) defines success in 
particularly narrow terms.  In order for intervention to be considered as success, hostilities 
must cease for a minimum of 5 years or multiple sovereignty is no longer the political reality 
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in the conflict state.  As Regan (1996) points out, this definition is far too bounded to be of 
practical use as a measure of success (footnote on Regan’s reasoning to be included).   
Bringing the conflict to an end within a reasonable period of peace following is therefore a 
satisfactory measure of success.     
I agree that the five year minimum suggested by Licklider is far too narrow to define 
success.  I have determined my own definition of success and will specify success in two 
ways.  Take, for example, the civil war in Greece that took place from 1944-1949.  The 
United States first intervened in the conflict in 1946 and subsequently in 1947.  I believe that 
to attribute a successful intervention to the United States would be erroneous.  Simply 
because a state chooses to intervene at some point in the conflict does not mean that the 
successful conclusion of the conflict should be considered a success.  I would argue that only 
those states that actively intervening at or near the end of the conflict should be credited 
with being successful in bringing about a peaceful end to that conflict.  Therefore, my first 
measure of success will be that a state is intervening either militarily or economically during 
the last recorded year of the conflict.  Thus, in order for an intervention to be considered 
successful, the war must end within one year of the intervention.  Success1 is a dichotomous 
variable that will be coded as 1 if a state actively intervened during the last year of the 
conflict and 0 otherwise.  However, this standard appears too rigid.  In order to relax the 
standard I will also run my models with a second success variable, success2.  It too is 
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dichotomous and will be coded 1 if a state intervenes and the conflict ends within two years 
of the intervention.  
4.2.5 Primary Independent Variable 
 The following analyses will be focused on the role that regime type plays in the decision 
to engage in high risk/high cost intrastate war interventions in addition to its effect on the success 
of those interventions.   As noted in chapter 3, democratic and non-democratic states should have 
an equal opportunity to assess the particular circumstances related to any given ongoing civil 
war.  However, due to the unique characteristics embodied in democratic regimes, the ability of 
policy makers within these regimes to avoid high risk interventions is much lower than their non-
democratic counterparts according to my theory.  The presence of a free press in addition to 
activated public opinion serves to pressure democratic policy makers to engage in risky 
interventionary behavior.  I argue that non-democratic policy makers are not subject to the same 
pressures from the public nor the exposure of policy preferences and therefore are often able to 
avoid high risk interventions.  Thus, democratic leader will be compelled to follow public 
opinion into high risk interventions that have little chance of success. 
 In order to measure the regime type of any potential or actual intervener, the data set uses 
Polity IV standards for determining regime type.  When a potential intervener’s score meets or 
exceed 6 then that state is considered a democratic state and the democratic intervener variable 
will be coded as 1.  When the Polity score is not available for a particular state the Freedom 
House “Free” designation will substitute as the indicator for an intervener being a democracy.  
Polity captures both democratic as well as autocratic qualities that exist within political 
institutions present in a state.  That is, rather than simply assigning a single characterization of 
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democracy or autocracy to a regime, the polity data examines various levels of authority 
throughout different components and procedures of a government.  Specifically, the system is 
characterized by measuring various components relative to how political leader are recruited and 
selected, what limitations are placed on the executive branch of government, and the openness of 
the political system relative as to who can participate in government.  Consequently, rather than 
having a -1, +1 (autocratic, democratic respectively) system of classification the Polity data can 
provide us with a more nuanced understanding of  regime type.  This more comprehensive 
analysis of regime type illustrates a “spectrum” of various levels of governmental authority 
ranging from “fully institutionalized autocracies through mixed, or incoherent, authority regimes 
(termed "anocracies") to fully institutionalized democracies” (Marshall and Gurr 2013).   
This method of coding regime types results in a 21 point regime type scale with a score 
range of -10 to +10.  The hereditary monarchy represented by a score of -10 represents the 
autocratic extreme while consolidated democracies with a score of +10 represent the opposite 
side of the scale.  Between these two extremes are a range of regime types with autocracies 
representing -10 to -6, anocracies being coded from -5 to +5, and democracies listed from +6 to 
+10.  These scores are converted to a 10 point scale for use in coding whether or not a party to 
the conflict qualifies as a democracy.  Again, a minimum score of six will be used to determine if 
a state qualifies as a democracy.  Additionally, there are three special categories (-66, -77, -88) 
that need to be addressed.  States coded as -66 are those in which there is foreign interruption in 
and treated as system missing data.  A score of -77 indicates a period of interregnum and are 
coded in PolityIV as a neutral score of 0.  A designation of -88 is used during periods of political 
transition.  In these instances, scores are prorated on an annual basis based on the score prior to 
65 
 
the -88 designation and the resulting score once a regime type can be assessed after the 
transition.  Regime type is coded for not only the interveners, but for the conflict state as well.   
4.2.6  Control Variables  
Following empirical work by Regan (2004), Lemke and Regan (2004), and Kathman 
(2011) I have chosen to use the analytical model used by Lemke and Regan and apply it to 
Kathman’s (2011) data.  Many of the control variables used in Kathman’s analysis will be used 
here as well.  The timeframe within which the conflict takes place should be considered relative 
to interventions.  Given the ideological struggle present during the Cold War and the desire of 
both superpowers to spread and maintain influence over their client states and/or use proxy 
combatants to indirectly challenge one another, it is to be expected that instances of intervention 
should be higher between 1945 and 1989 (Regan 1998, 2000).  Accordingly, a Cold War dummy 
variable is included by designating years between and including 1945 and 1989 to account for 
the ideological struggle between the United States and Soviet Union.  More intractable conflicts 
do not lend themselves to being ripe for intervention.  Those conflicts in which the annual 
casualty rate is particularly high deter some potential interveners from attempting to affect the 
conflict.  The Intensity variable in the data represents this and will be included in the analysis.  In 
three models the Refugee variable will be included.  Again, I hypothesize that democracies in 
particular will be more apt to intervene when a refugee crisis exists.  Two other conflict 
characteristics concern the root cause of the conflict.  Ideological conflicts and ethnic conflicts 
both have the tendency to attract third party intervention (Lemke and Regan 2004, Kathman 
2011).  As such, such they too will be include in the analysis. 
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Another potential indicator of intervention is whether or not the potential intervener and 
the target state share a defense pact.  It stands to reason that if the conflict countries government 
were threatened by either an outside or native threat, that the potential intervener would act in a 
similar fashion.  That is, if the conflict state’s government were threatened and the pact partner 
had pledged to intervene on the government’s behalf, it should not matter where the threat arises.  
Accordingly, the data set includes an Alliance variable.  To determine the alliance status of any 
dyadic pair of states, the authors refer to Correlates of War alliance data with specific attention to 
the EUGene compilation data and dyads with an existing alliance at the time of the conflict will 
be coded as 1 (Gibler and Sarkees 2004).  Also of interest to potential interveners is the past 
relationship that they might have shared with a particular country.  A colonial history variable is 
included to indicate that which potential interveners had previously colonized the target state.  
The expectation is that intervention is more likely given this history and thus the Colonial 
History variable is included in the data set to identify these dyadic relationships.  The Issue 
Correlates of War Project (Hensel 2007) provides the information that the authors used to code 
this variable.  If there was a colonial history then the variable will be coded as 1. Geographic 
proximity to the conflict state has been shown to be highly correlated to instances of intervention 
(Kathman 2011).  His research has shown that due to the risk of conflict contagion and in the 
interest of regional stability, border-states are significantly more likely to intervene in 
neighboring states’ civil wars.  The Contiguity variable is derived from data compiled by Stinnett 
et al. (2002). 
There is also some evidence that the regime type of the conflict state produces variation 
in the observations of intervention.  Generally speaking democracies are significantly less likely 
to be targets of interventions.  Democracies are theorized to enjoy greater levels of security.  
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Recent research into this theory tends to support the hypothesis that democracies benefit from 
greater security and stability and are thus less likely to experience intervention (Herrman and 
Kegley 1996).  Target states that are by the aforementioned Polity/Freedom House criteria 
considered democracies during the period of conflict will be coded 1.  As mentioned in the above 
section on democratic interveners, Polity IV and Freedom House data are used to specify which 
dyads include democratic target of intervention.  Conflicts in which the target state is a 
democracy (+7 or greater) should be negatively correlated with intervention.   Furthermore, a 
joint democracy variable is included in the data set when both the target state and the intervener 
are coded a 1 according to the state criterion for determining regime type.  In Regan and 
Lemke’s analysis this variable was negative but not significant.  However, because of the 
variation in my model specification, I have decided to include it as well. 
The ability of major powers to project their power and influence should weigh on the 
decision to intervene.  Great powers have far flung interests and the ability to affect those 
interests both militarily and economically.  Therefore it should not be surprising to see that major 
powers are often observed intervening disproportionally (Lemke and Regan 2004, Kathman 
2011).  A Major Power variable is therefore included in the intervention analysis as well as the 
success portion of the model.  Annual categorization of any third parties ability to act as a major 
power is determined in the COW data (Correlates of War Project 2008).  Finally, previous 
research appears to indicate that African nations are disproportionally reluctant to conduct 
interventions (Lemke 2002).  There are varied explanations for this behavior.  It could be the 
case that African nations prefer more peaceful forms of international relations.  Alternatively, the 
ability of African nations to fund or otherwise conduct military or economic intervention is low 
relative to many other potential interveners, particularly industrial democracies.  While this 
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analysis will not address which of these hypotheses is correct, I felt that because of the negative 
and significant finding in previous research that it was a suitable control variable.  If the potential 
intervener state is located on the African continent or occupies land on an island adjacent to the 
continent, it will be coded 1.   
When testing for success a number of other variables will be included.  Per my argument, 
the regime type of the potential intervener is important and will be used as a variable in the 
success model in the same form that it exists in the intervention model.  Additionally, the type 
and target of the intervention has some bearing on the likelihood of success.  Included in the data 
set are variables used in Lemke and Regan’s (2004) analysis.  I have excluded their variables 
related to the specific targeting of interventions as they do not pertain to my theoretical 
arguments.   According to the authors’ analysis the type of conflict has an impact on whether or 
not the intervention will be successful.  In both instances there is a negative coefficient.  
However, neither is significant.  What is significant is the fact that their research seems to 
indicate that great powers have a much greater likelihood of success when they choose to 
intervene.  Finally, because the primary focus of this dissertation concerns regime type, I will be 
including a Democratic Intervener variable, coding it exactly as it is in the intervention portion of 
the model.  According to my expectations, because democracies should choose to intervene in 
intractable conflicts, I expect them to be less successful when they do decide to intervene. 
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Table 4.1 Censored Probit Analysis of Intervention and Success in Civil War 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Success1 Full Model Fatality Dummy = 1 Fatality Dummy = 0 Refugees = 1 Refugees = 0
Ideology   5.05 4.48 5.50 4.83 6.14
Ethnic    5.19 4.87 5.44 4.95 6.10
Great Power -0.18 -0.04 -0.38 -0.007188   -0.67
Democratic Intervener 0.13 -0.14 0.33 0.01 0.57
constant   -6.98 -6.24 -7.23 -7.00 -7.96
Intervention 
Intense    8.43e-06   0.00000753 -0.0000259   0.0000109* -0.0000156
Refugee 0.23***   0.81***  0.14**   -- --
Coldwar    0.52***   0.40***  0.60***   0.50***  0.57***   
Fatal    4.72e-07***  4.60e-07**  2.28e-06  5.56e-07***   -1.67e-06  
Alliance  0.35***  0.25**  0.47*** 0.01 0.93*** 
Colonial History 0.50***  0.30**   0.64***  0.55***   0.37**   
Great Power Intervener 1.36***  1.53***   1.29***  1.35*** 1.55***  
African Intervener 0.12*   0.21* 0.02 0.11 0.17
Democratic Intervener 0.09**  0.33*** -0.07 0.11*   0.04
Democratic Target -0.18* -0.24 -0.24 -0.63**   -0.05
Joint Democracy  -0.14  -20.8611          .        .-0.01 0.20 -0.19
Ethnic Conflict 0.60*** 0.70***  0.40**   0.65***   0.71***   
Ideological Conflict  0.78***    0.92***  0.58***  1.00***  0.40**   
Contiguous State  1.27*** 1.26***  1.30***   1.43***  1.01***  
constant   -4.50***  -5.17***   -4.26*** -4.39***  -4.53***  
Note:
*** Significant at the .01 level
** Significant at the .05 level
* Significant at the .1 level
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4.3 Empirical Results and Discussion  
Table 1 reports the empirical results for both my independent variables as well as the 
control variables, the most important of which as it relates to this dissertation, is democratic 
intervener.  Model 1 includes all independent variables and runs the censored probit model 
without accounting for variations in my intensity variables.  Models 2 and 3 rerun the analysis on 
cases where the fatality intensity variable is on and off respectively.  Finally, models 4 and 5 
Table 4.2 Censored Probit Analysis of Intervention and Success in Civil War 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Success2 Full Model Fatality Dummy = 1 Fatality Dummy = 0 Refugees = 1 Refugees = 0
Ideology   0 .50 0.80**   -0.22 0.63 0.49
Ethnic    0.86**   1.09*** 0.17 0.89* 1.04
Great Power 0.05 0.68***    -0.31 0.20 -.65
Democratic Intervener 0.18 -.01 0.48** 0.02 1.04***   
constant   -2.47***   -3.66***   -1.17 -2.66***   -2.57** 
Intervention 
Intense    6.77e-06  -2.25e-06 -0.000027   9.15e-06   -0.0000256  
Refugee 0.23***  0.75***   0.14**   -- --
Coldwar    0.51***    0.37***   0.60***   0.48***  0.58 *** 
Fatal    4.93e-07***  5.73e-07***  2.26e-06   5.71e-07***  -1.59e-06   
Alliance  0.35***   0.22*  0.47*** 0.01 0.92***   
Colonial History 0.50 ***   0.33** 0.64 *** 0.56***   0.36***  
Great Power Intervener 1.36***  1.53*** 1.30***   1.35*** 1.55***  
African Intervener 0.13** 0.22**  0.03 0.12 0.19
Democratic Intervener 0.09* 0.32***  -0.07 0.11* 0.03
Democratic Target -0.18* -0.24 -0.24**   -.62** -0.05
Joint Democracy  -0.12 -5.83e+07          .        .-0.01 0.20 -0.16
Ethnic Conflict 0.60***  0.77***   0.40** 0.65***   0.71***  
Ideological Conflict  0.79***   0.94***   0.58*** 1.01***  0.41**    
Contiguous State  1.27*** 1.27***   1.30***  1.43***  1.01***
constant   -4.50***  -5.10***  -4.26***  -4.38***  -4.54***   
Note:
*** Significant at the .01 level
** Significant at the .05 level
* Significant at the .1 level
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substitute the intensity variable refugee for the fatality variable and run the analysis both with 
and without the refugee variable.  Of particular interest to the aims of this research, I find that 
democracies are more likely to intervene in particularly intense conflicts no matter which of the 
measures I use to determine intensity.  The results for success are another matter.   
While the results of the fully specified model are interesting in and of themselves, and in 
large part reinforce the findings of previous researchers, my hypotheses focus specifically on 
democratic intervention and success in high intensity civil wars.  I have argued that democracies 
are more likely than non-democracies to intervene in conflicts that should be considered more 
intractable and thus higher cost endeavors.  I have further asserted that because democracies 
select into interventions in high intensity conflict, they are less likely to be successful.  As 
mentioned previously, I have constructed two variables to indicate higher levels of intractability 
in any given conflict.   
When the fatality dummy is set to 1, as it appears in model 2, the democratic intervener 
variable is both positive and highly significant.  This suggests that when fatalities are observed to 
be higher than normal, democratic interveners are more likely to enter these conflicts, 
presumably to prevent or reduce future fatalities.  The African intervener is also positive and 
significant as it was in the full model.  Additionally, the democratic state variable, while still 
negative, is no longer significant.  When I analyze only those conflicts where the fatality dummy 
is zero (model 3), the coefficient for the democratic intervener variable reverses direction though 
it is not significant and the African intervener variable once again becomes statistically 
insignificant.  Based on these analyses, the evidence suggests that democracies are more likely 
than non-democracies to be observed intervening in cases of civil war where costs are high and 
the conflicts seemingly more intractable. 
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I find similar results when I substitute the refugee dummy for the fatality dummy to 
determine which conflicts could be categorized as intense or intractable.  In model 4, I run the 
censored probit model only on those intervention opportunities where the number of refugees 
exceeds 50,000 (refugee dummy = 1).  The alliance and African intervener variables are no 
longer significant.  Most importantly the democratic intervener stays positive and significant 
under these conditions.  All other control variables behave in the manner in which they did when 
the full model was run.  Alternatively, when I set the refugee variable to zero (model 5) and 
rerun the analysis, the democratic intervener variable is still positive but no longer statistically 
significant.  The results of these analyses seems to indicate a greater propensity of democratic 
states to intervene when a humanitarian crisis is ongoing and supports my theoretical argument 
regarding the ability of democratic publics to pressure their governments to intervene when they 
witness this type of crisis.  Additionally, the alliance variable is once again highly significant.   
While the results of the intervention portion of the analysis match with my theoretical 
expectations I found less support for my second hypothesis.  When defining successful 
intervention as being the presence of a third party in the final year of the conflict the results 
appear to contradict the findings of Lemke and Regan (2004).  I should note that given any of the 
model specifications none of the control variables rose to a statistically significant level.  In the 
Lemke and Regan model, both ethnic conflict and ideological coefficients are negative though 
not significant.  In each of my models the coefficients are positive albeit not significant.  
Previous research appears to indicate that great power interveners are significantly more likely to 
embark on successful interventions.  Surprisingly, across all five of my models, I observe 
negative coefficients for the great power variable, though none is significant.  Perhaps most 
importantly for the purposes of this dissertation, the democratic success observations do not meet 
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my expectations.  In models 1, 2, 3, and 5 the coefficients are all positive but again not 
statistically significant.  Model 2, in which the fatality dummy variable is activated, the 
democratic intervener coefficient is oriented in the expected direction (negative) but it too does 
not reach the standard of statistical significance.   
Due to the possibility of my using too strict a standard when defining success I repeated 
the analysis using a slightly more relaxed standard.  In these analyses, success is recognized if a 
third party was actively intervening during the last two years of the conflict.  Unsurprisingly, the 
vast majority of the variables behave consistently in all ten models related to intervention.  Two 
deviations are worth noting however.  In model 4 where the refugee variable is activated, 
intensity stops being a significant variable.  More interesting however is the observation (model 
3) that democratic states that are experiencing low level conflicts tend to be avoided by 
interveners.  Generally speaking, the democratic peace literature posits that this should be 
expected (Hermann and Kegley1996; Kegley and Hermann 1995).  When reporting my initial set 
of findings, democratic conflict states were only negatively associated with intervention when 
the full model was specified and when the refugees dummy was activated.  In this secondary 
analysis, which takes into account for varying degrees of conflict intensity, it appears that only 
under certain conditions are democracies unlikely targets of intervention.  In my analysis third 
parties are most hesitant when there is a refugee crisis or if the casualties are relatively low.  
While the results in the intervention portion of the censored probit model appear largely similar, 
there is significant deviation in the models as well as some significant differences from the 
results reported by Lemke and Regan (2004) when the more relaxed standard of success is 
applied to the models.   
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While my initial analyses indicated that none of the control variables were significantly 
related to success, the findings of the second set of models differ in some very important ways.  
While Lemke and Regan had consistently negative, though not significant, finding regarding 
success in ethnic and ideological conflicts I find that under certain circumstances these conflict 
characteristics can positively influence success.  In models 1, 4, and 5, the coefficients are all 
positive though not significant.  However, when the fatality dummy is activated I observe a 
positive and statistically significant correlation between ideological conflict and success.  When 
the fatality dummy is turned off, the direction of the coefficient becomes negative and is no 
longer significant.  Ethnic conflict is also positively related to success under the specification of 
the full model and when both of my intensity dummies are activated.  Another variation, and one 
that partially supports previous findings in the literature regarding great power success, is the 
observation that great powers are successful though in my models this only occurs under 
conditions of high casualty conflicts.  Concerning the variable of most interest to me, democratic 
interveners, the results are mixed.  When the full model is specified and when the refugee 
dummy is activated the coefficients are positive though not significant.  When the fatality 
dummy is activated I observe my theoretically expected negative coefficient though it is not 
significant.  It is only when the intensity variables, refugee and fatality, are deactivated that I 
observe positive and significant correlation with successful intervention.  While these results do 
not bear out my theoretical expectations regarding the success of democracies, it is interesting to 
note that it appears that democracies are significantly more likely to successfully intervene, again 
under a less strict standard of success, when the conflict tends to be less intense or intractable.     
Again, I feel that the censored probit model is the most appropriate form of analysis and 
thus those models using censored probit analysis were reported.  However, previous research has 
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been done using both probit and logit regression models.  In the interest of being more 
comprehensive in my analysis I ran additional single-step probit analyses on intervention and 
both success variables to determine whether or not the results varied from those reported in the 
censored probit model.  For the most part the results of the probit analysis regarding intervention 
onset closely mirrors the results derived from the censored probit analysis.  The one exception is 
that the African intervener variable shows both a positive and highly significant coefficient when 
the refugee variable is activated.  Whereas there are only minor differences between the probit 
and censored  probit observations with regard to intervention initiation, when considering the 
probit analysis of the success1 variable, I do find some rather stark differences.  The ideological 
conflict variable becomes positive and highly significant in the first 4 of the five models.  The 
ethnic conflict variable becomes positive and significant when the fatality dummy variable is 
activated.  The results of the probit model now show positive and significant coefficients for 
great powers in every case.  Most importantly, the democratic intervener variable begins to 
behave the theoretically predicted manner to a degree.  In model 2, with the fatality dummy 
activated, I observe democratic interveners being negatively and significantly associated with 
intervention success.  While this analysis does not account for selection effect, it in part supports 
my theoretical claim that democracies will opt into intractable conflicts and are for the reasons 
stated in chapter 3 less likely to achieve successful outcomes.  
The majority of the control variables behave in a similar fashion to the manner in which 
they did in both Lemke and Regan (2004) and Kathman (2011) analyses.  In the case of 
Kathman’s analysis, only intervention onset results will be compared as he did not consider 
success in his analysis.  When the censored probit is run on the full model, the refugee variable is 
both positive and significant reflecting the tendency of third parties to intervene when a refugee 
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crisis occurs.  Conflicts occurring during the cold war are perhaps unsurprisingly, given the 
ideological conflict between the superpowers, more prone to interventions.  This finding is 
consistent across all of the models run in these analyses.  Conflict states which have a dyadic 
alliance with a third party are also more likely to experience intervention.  Third parties with a 
past colonial history with a conflicted nation are similarly more likely to intervene in the former 
colonial states thus reflecting that historical ties between nations can be an impetus for current 
interest.  Great powers are, given their greater ability to project power along with wider global 
interests in general, are found to be among the most likely states to engage in interventionary 
behavior.  Like the cold war variable, great and colonial powers are found to be positively related 
to intervention across all models.   
Like Kathman, I found that democracies had a greater propensity to intervene in civil 
wars in general.  While Lemke and Regan’s coefficient was positive it was not significant.  
When considering whether or not democratic states in a condition of civil war are more or less 
likely to experience an intervention the results have been mixed.  My full model seems to 
indicate that, like Hermann and Kegley (1996) and Kathman (2011), democracies are less likely 
that their non-democratic counterparts to experience third party intervention.  This contradicts 
the finding by Lemke and Regan (2004) that democracies are more likely the targets of 
intervention.  Ethnic and ideological conflicts are in every model in my analysis both positively 
and significantly likely to see intervention.  When third parties share a border with a state 
experiencing conflict the likelihood of intervention also increases.  This result too is consistent in 
all of my models.  In none of the models used was a joint democratic dyad significantly related 
to intervention onset.  Ethnic and ideologically driven conflicts were in each model run both 
positively and significantly related to intervention onset.  Sharing a border with a state 
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experiencing conflict appears to be a clear impetus for contiguous states to intervene.  This most 
probably reflects the fear of diffusion of the conflict into surrounding states or general 
destabilization of the region.   Interestingly, my findings depart from expectations of Lemke and 
Regan’s (2004) previous research regarding African interveners.  In two of my models, model 1 
(full model) and model 2 (activated fatality dummy), I find African interveners to be positively 
and significantly associated with intervention.  Of particular interest is the positive result when 
fatalities are particularly high.  This finding could lend support to Lemke and Regan’s (2004) 
assertion that intervention may, rather than a hostile act, be a means of conflict management.  In 
the case of civil wars with proportionally high fatalities we could see this correlation as an 
example of African states attempting to manage particularly disastrous conflicts. 
4.4 Summary 
 As stated in the introduction to this chapter, the goal of this chapter is threefold.  I have 
successfully described the data used for the subsequent analysis by identifying the various 
dependent and independent variable used in the various models.  I have shown how these 
variables are specified and why I believe there inclusion is important.  The second goal was to 
explain to the reader why I insisted on using the censored probit model.  It was important to help 
the reader understand why I chose this analytical model over other, perhaps more conventional 
analytical tools.  Finally, I performed not only the censored probit analysis but also performed 
separate probit analyses to model the analysis that Kathman performed relative to intervention 
onset.  Generally speaking it appears that only one of my hypotheses was supported through the 
empirical analyses.  I have hypothesized that democratic publics pressure their governments to 
engage in risky interventions.  It seems as though democratic interveners tend to target difficult 
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to resolve civil wars more often than their non democratic counterparts and thus that my 
hypothesis regarding intervention onset appears to have some empirical support.   
Conversely, there does not appear to be empirical evidence supporting my second 
hypothesis regarding intervention success.  I have previously argued that the same domestic 
forces that drive intervention initiation also drive democratic states to abandon their intervention 
effort when public pressure to withdraw is evident.  I found little empirical support for this 
hypothesis.  It does not appear that democratic governments are less successful in their 
interventionary behavior even when the conflicts are more intractable and the costs borne by the 
intervener are presumably much higher.  While this finding does comport with my theory, 
perhaps this is a positive result.  In effect, the negative findings regarding my second hypothesis 
seem to indicate  that once a democratic intervener commits to action, they are more likely to 
stay the course and commit to the peaceful resolution of civil wars even when the cost to the is 
potentially great.  Perhaps more importantly with regard to my understanding of civil war 
processes, my observations of democratic success bring something new to the literature.  I found 
that democracies are no more or less successful than their nondemocratic counterparts when 
intervening in civil wars.  This is an important finding.  The vast majority of the democratic 
peace literature seems to indicate that democracies are far more successful in combat operations 
than are non-democracies.  This however only holds true when the conflict is on a interstate 
nature.  I do not however observe this tendency when analyzing their performance relative to 
civil war intervention.  I believe that these findings make a subtle but important contribution to 
the literature on civil war processes and to a greater understanding regarding successful military 
action based on the type of conflict being entered into.   
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CHAPTER 5:  CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
5.1 Review 
 In the post WWII era the world has witnessed a precipitous decline in instances of 
conflict between nation states.  While this may provide us with some sense of comfort, during 
the very same time span we have seen a surge in intrastate violence.  As such scholars in the field 
of international relations have increasingly attempted to study various aspects of these conflicts.  
A large portion of the early research in the field focused on the internal dynamics of these 
conflicts.  Questions such as why they occur and what the characteristics of the parties involved 
in the fighting obviously needed to be addressed.  Early analysis of these conflicts tended to view 
them as strictly internal conflicts from which external states would be insulated from.  It is not 
until somewhat recently that civil wars have been characterized as international events.  More 
recent scholarship has provided us with an abundance of evidence that many of the negative 
consequences of these conflicts can rapidly move beyond the conflicted states borders and 
directly or indirectly impact not only neighboring states, but entire regions.  Some conflicts may 
indeed have a system wide impact.   
 Recognizing this, more recent attention has been given to the study of interventionary 
behavior by third party states.  While recognizing civil wars as international events much of the 
existing research has focused on the particular internal characteristics of the conflict state.  That 
is, third parties will often analyze the forces driving the conflict in determining whether or not an 
80 
 
intervention is either necessary or likely to be successful.  There has of course been discussion of 
whether or not characteristics of third party interveners leads to intervention and/or success.  For 
example, we have observed that great power states are more likely to intervene in civil wars and 
are also more successful.  However, in my review of the literature, I noticed a rather stark 
omission.  A thorough discussion of whether or not an intervener’s regime type plays a role in 
intervention processes is notably absent.  It appears much of the literature assumes that most if 
not all potential interveners use the same cost benefit calculus when deciding whether or not to 
intervene in intrastate conflict.   
 My argument is that democracies and autocracies have some very particular institutional 
characteristics that have thus far been ignored in the literature.  There are specific expectations 
and constraints placed on public policy makers in democracies that do not occur in autocracies.  
Why then should we expect that states of varying regime types would use identical approaches to 
making foreign policy decisions?  This is the question that initiated this project and the one that I 
have endeavored to answer throughout this dissertation.  I argue that domestic political 
considerations are an important, yet understudied, facet of the civil war intervention literature.  
Because of domestic political pressure to engage in interventionary behavior, democratic 
governments are more likely to intervene in civil wars in general.  The reasoning behind why I 
believe this to be the case is evident in my theoretical argument which I presented in Chapter 3.  
While this is in and of itself of some perhaps minor interest it is my take on which interventions 
these democratic policy makers choose or are compelled to intervene in that makes this research 
unique and thus a worthy addition to the growing body of literature in this field.   
 I have argued that domestic political pressure not only compels democratic policy makers 
to intervene in civil wars generally, but forces their hand into intervening in the most intractable 
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and violent conflicts.  Democratic publics force leaders to engage in the most costly conflicts in 
terms of blood and treasure.  The paradox that I spoke of earlier is that these same democratic 
publics that push for intervention in the most intractable of conflicts are the same ones that, once 
aware of the mounting costs of intervention, pressure leaders to abandon these interventions 
before they have a realistic chance of succeeding.  Thus, the paradoxical nature of democratic 
public opinion serves to limit democratic policy makers’ room to maneuver politically when 
considering whether or not to engage in high cost/low reward interventions.  Chapter 3 lays the 
foundation for my expectation that democratic regimes will both intervene more often than their 
non-democratic counterparts and ultimately less successful. 
5.2 New Variables and Results of Analysis Related to Hypotheses 
In chapter 4, I provide a framework for analysis of my hypotheses.  This analysis 
incorporates many of the most commonly used variables included in previous research on both 
intervention onset and success.  My addition to the research includes incorporating a regime type 
variable into the data to determine whether or not democracies do in fact intervene in civil wars 
more often than their autocratic counterparts.  Additionally, I created two independent variables 
that control for conflict type.  These variables trim the data in such a way that only the most 
intense conflict year data are used in the analysis.  The first measures conflict intensity on annual 
casualties.  The second uses refugee migration as a measure of conflict intensity.    
My second contribution to the data are definitions of success that I believe to be 
relatively conservative in nature and best able to determine which states were able to successful 
intervene.  The first, and most restrictive, limits success to only those states that intervened in the 
82 
 
final year of the conflict.  I then relaxed this standard to include any state that has intervened 
within 2 years of a cessation in hostilities.   
The results of my analysis are mixed.  Many of the more common variables used in the 
literature tend to behave in much the same way as in previous analyses with a few notable 
exceptions which are discussed in the previous chapters.   Looking at my variables, the results do 
not always meet my expectations.  My analysis reveals that democratic states do engage in 
interventionary behavior that is distinct from non-democracies.  I find compelling evidence for 
the notion that democratic states intervene in civil wars where the potential cost for intervention 
is high.  That is, they gravitate to conflicts where the likelihood of success is measurably low.  I 
argue that this is in large part due to domestic political pressure.  Democratic publics compel 
their leaders to intervene in cases where obvious human rights abuses exist, the level of violence 
is great, and humanitarian crises are evident.   
However, turning to my second hypotheses, the results are not as compelling.  I found 
little evidence that democratic states are less successful than non-democracies when they do 
decided to intervene.  Even in the most difficult cases.  While not the result I was expecting, I 
believe that it still tells us something useful about regime type and intervention processes.  The 
results of the analysis do not indicate that democracies fare worse than non-democracies during 
interventions.  It simply means that compared to the level of success democracies experience in 
interstate wars they are less effective in successfully concluding intrastate conflict.  There could 
be multiple reasons for this finding.  My specification for which wars would be considered high 
intensity conflicts may need to be adjusted in some way.  Alternatively, my specifications 
regarding how success is measured and which states could be considered successful might be too 
restrictive.  On this point I would say however that I intentionally used relatively conservative 
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measures to determine what constituted success.  I believe that for this project that was the 
prudent choice.  Finally, there may be fundamental differences in the nature of interstate and 
intrastate war that I failed to consider when forming my theory and hypotheses.  In this paper I 
have analyzed civil war intervention by focusing not on the internal characteristics of the 
conflict, but rather through a thoughtful analysis of the intervener.  It appears that there are 
shortcomings by employing these approaches separately.  Future research should attempt to fuse 
these disparate approaches in order that we might gain a better understanding of civil war 
processes. 
5.3 Conclusion 
 What my research suggests is that there are deficiencies of understanding and 
communication between democratic publics and policy makers.  Democratic publics may be, 
perhaps understandably, less inclined to consume vast quantities of hard news.  The trend of 
individuals turning away from hard news sources in favor of more personalized and 
sensationalized content has been exhibited throughout much of the literature on media usage.  I 
have argued that citizens in democratic states may only be exposed to discussions of foreign 
policy and the implications of world events on their lives.  Much of the coverage of international 
events tends to focus on world crises at their peak.  That is, the initial stages of conflict and 
humanitarian crises along with the events toward the end of these conflicts tend to be ignored by 
media outlets.  Thus many individuals are quite ill informed about these events and are often 
only viewing these events with little context as to the nature of them.  I have argued that being 
exposed to peak conflict leads to an emotional response in publics that fails to consider the 
conflicts and their implication as a whole.   
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Furthermore, individuals have little concept of the costs, both human and capital, of 
intervening in these conflicts.  Many times media tends to focus on troop levels.  I argue that this 
distorts the actual cost of conflict and perhaps leads many citizens to underestimate the true cost 
that will be incurred.  For example, during the peak of the Iraq war, the functional Teeth-to Tail 
ratio of combat troops to noncombat troops was 1 to 2.5 in 2013.  With the cost of contract 
workers included the combat element in that conflict was around 28%.  I suspect that these 
figures are reflected in intervention campaigns as well.  An inattentive population that is largely 
ignorant of this reality may well underestimate these costs and therefore be more likely to accept 
this deflated perception of costs.   
I argue that it is imperative that policy makers make efforts to inform the broader 
population of these “hidden” costs.  However, I concede that this task is one that will require 
tremendous effort and will force administrations to modify their information campaigns to more 
effectively target citizens.  The ever increasing options in available media outlets will only make 
this job more difficult.  Moreover, the tendency of policy makers to want to make policy out of 
view of the public only amplifies the problem.  I have presented evidence that indicates that 
democratic publics push policy makers to intervene in intractable conflict.  If policy makers wish 
to resist the pressure to intervene they will have to be willing to communicate more openly with 
citizens in order to better explain what they believe is in the interest of their nation.  Future 
research focusing of effectively conveying information to mass public in a growing sea of 
information would be useful in attempting to close the gaps between policy makers and citizens 
regarding n the national interests and citizens preferences.   
My work here has focused on a very narrow question.  Does regime type matter when 
states choose to intervene in civil wars?  What about institutions like the United Nations and 
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NATO?  Throughout the 20
th
 and 21
st
 centuries we have increasingly witnessed these 
organizations engage in interventionary behavior.  I believe that an extension of my argument 
could be made with regard to these organizations.  Again, we witness democracies intervening 
more often in hard to resolve conflicts more often than non-democracies.  It may be that the latter 
are willing to assist in interventions but perhaps do not have the capacity to do so unilaterally.  It 
would be interesting to see how non-democracies willingness to work through the United 
Nations compares to democratic states.  Future research may find that less capable and less 
democratic states are just as willing participate in interventions.  One could argue that my 
arguments apply more so to powerful democratic states’ behavior than democratic states in 
general.  Because of my decision to exclude United Nations activities this is a legitimate point of 
view.  Research applying my theoretical arguments to United Nations or NATO campaigns could 
very well indicate that democratic states without the capacity to intervene themselves might 
choose to work through other organizations and alliances.  If this is the case we may be able to 
argue that democratic publics are not in fact as insensitive to costs as my research indicates.  
Such research could also shed better light on my theories about democratic success in 
interventions.  Perhaps democracies are more successful when they operate as coalitions than as 
unilateral actors.  Whatever the results of future research indicate regarding regime type and civil 
war intervention, the contribution of my research has not only been to help answer the questions 
that I put forward but to generate new questions for myself and other researchers to address. 
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